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Contract Law’s Transferability Bias
PAUL MACMAHON*
When A makes a contract with B, it comes as no surprise that she is liable to B. If B
can transfer her contractual rights to C, A is now liable to C. Parties in A’s position
often have strong reasons to avoid being liable to suit by C. Contract law, however,
seems determined to minimize and override these concerns. Under current doctrine
on the assignment of contractual rights—the focus of this Article—the law often
imposes its own preference for transferability on the parties. The law generally
assumes that contractual rights are assignable, construes exceptions to that general
rule narrowly, and renders it either impossible or extremely difficult for the parties
to make rights nonassignable by agreement. After examining the range of techniques
courts and legislators use to promote the transferability of contractual rights, the
Article contends that these practices cannot be squared with contract law’s basic
principles. The law’s pro-transferability policy appears to be based on an intuitive
but dubious economic theory, which in turn is premised on an inaccurate vision of
contracts as impersonal exchanges. The Article proposes reforms to make this aspect
of contract law more faithful to the relationships it regulates and supports.
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INTRODUCTION
Should contractual rights be transferable? It depends. Rights holders generally prefer
to have the option to transfer their rights, whereas those subject to duties often have
reasons to prefer rights to be nontransferable. If transferability were treated as an
ordinary contract issue, the law would not exhibit a preference either for or against
it. Contractual rights would be transferable where the parties agreed to make them
transferable; likewise, they would be nontransferable where the parties agreed to
make them nontransferable, unless there was some special reason to doubt that the
term was the product of genuine agreement. Where the parties had not made an
express provision either way, courts would apply a default rule crafted to maximize
the joint value of the contract; the content of the rule would depend, for the most
part, on whether transferability or non-transferability would maximize the parties’
joint value.
But that is not contemporary contract law’s approach. Instead, the law of
assignment—the body of doctrine mostly responsible for governing transfers of
contractual rights—is biased towards transferability. Consider these examples:
(i) “Grudge Assignee”: Oliver hires Andrea to replace the floors in Oliver’s home.
The contract says nothing about whether Andrea’s rights are assignable. After
Andrea does the work, Oliver gets into financial difficulty and asks for more time to
pay the debt. Tatiana, Oliver’s neighbor, has held a long-standing grudge against
Oliver and sees the chance to drive him into bankruptcy. She pays Andrea to assign
the debt to her. In return, Tatiana agrees to transfer the proceeds of any successful
legal action to Andrea; Tatiana’s interest in suing Oliver is purely spiteful. A court
is likely to allow Tatiana’s suit against Oliver to proceed: contractual rights are
generally assignable in the absence of agreement to the contrary and there is no
exception for malicious transferees (or “assignees”).1
(ii) “Disputatious Developer”: Ophelia Corp. is a construction company. It agrees
to build an apartment block for Andrew, a property developer. Construction contracts
are notoriously prone to disputes, so Ophelia Corp. wants to deal only with Andrew,
with whom Ophelia has a long-term relationship. At Ophelia’s insistence, the written
contract contains nonassignment clauses. The contract states: “This contract is not
assignable.” For good measure, the contract also says that Andrew “shall not assign
his rights under the contract.” Later, however, Andrew suffers from a cash-flow
problem, and so he purports to sell his contractual rights to Donald, a developer with
a terrible reputation for litigiousness. A court is likely to recognize the assignment
and to allow Donald to sue Ophelia in the event of a contractual dispute. Despite the

1. See infra Section II.A..
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apparently plain language of the clauses, most courts will construe them to preserve
rather than deny the power to assign.2
(iii) “Interloping Bank”: Oscar’s Bakery needs flour, so it enters into a year-long
flour supply contract with Acme Flour Corp. Oscar wants to ensure that it is only
obligated to Acme because assignment increases the risk of paying the wrong
creditor due to administrative error. At the time of the contract, Acme does not see
any particular reason it would want to transfer its rights to someone else, so Acme
happily agrees to a contractual clause stating: “The parties hereby agree that any
attempt by Acme to assign its rights under this contract is totally and absolutely
invalid, void, and of no effect.” Nevertheless, Acme later purports to assign its rights
to payment under the contract to Terrestrial Bank as part of a refinancing transaction.
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), the nonassignment
clause is void and Acme is liable to suit by Terrestrial Bank.3
In each of these cases, the defendant may object that she did not expect this
plaintiff, a stranger to the contract, to be able to sue her. She may say that she would
never have dreamed of entering into a contract with this person (as in “Grudge
Assignee”). She may complain that she sought to protect herself from exactly this
contingency by negotiating a clause prohibiting it (as in “Disputatious Developer”
and “Interloping Bank”). In each of the examples, however, the court is likely to
reject these arguments and allow the suit to proceed. Contractual rights are generally
assignable, subject only to narrow exceptions (such as in “Grudge Assignee”).
Attempts to make them nonassignable will often be interpreted not to have this effect
(as in “Disputatious Developer”) unless the parties use a special form of words. Even
where the parties choose the “magic words” that would be interpreted so as to render
the assignment void (as in “Interloping Bank”), a court will often be required to
disregard this aspect of the parties’ agreement because of Article 9’s mandatory
assignability rule.
These examples illustrate what courts say explicitly: “the law looks ‘with favor
on the free assignability of rights and frowns on restrictions that would limit or
preclude assignability.’”4 In this regard, the law treats contractual rights quite
differently from contractual duties. Contractual duties may sometimes be delegated
to, and vicariously performed by, someone else. But even then, unless the parties
have expressly agreed otherwise, the original promisor remains subject to the duty
she undertook and will be liable if it is not performed.5 For obvious reasons—
trustworthiness, competence, creditworthiness—the law recognizes that the identity
of the person subject to a contractual duty and amenable to suit for breach is typically
crucial. But the law has a general tendency to treat the identity of a contractual

2. See infra Section II.C.
3. See infra Section II.D.
4. Easton Bus. Opportunities, Inc. v. Town Exec. Suites—E. Marketplace, L.L.C., 230
P.3d 827, 830 (Nev. 2010) (quoting 9 JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 49.9, at
214 (rev. ed. 2007)); see also Wykeham Rise, L.L.C. v. Federer, 52 A.3d 702, 717 (Conn.
2012) (“Assignability of rights is clearly favored with respect to contracts generally.”).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Unless the
obligee agrees otherwise, neither delegation of performance nor a contract to assume the duty
made with the obligor by the person delegated discharges any duty or liability of the delegating
obligor.”).
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rightholder as insignificant. In this regard, contract law has come a long way since
medieval common law, which held that contractual rights were, by their nature,
personal to the parties and hence nontransferable.6 A detailed examination of the law
shows that contemporary contract law tends to hold that rights should be transferable,
regardless of party intention.
Contract law’s bias in favor of transferability, then, is not based on freedom of
contract: indeed, it runs counter to contemporary contract law’s general principle of
party autonomy. If not freedom of contract, what explains the law’s move to a protransferability policy? The shift to alienability appears to be a symptom of broader
currents in economic thought.7 Scholars of economic history have analyzed
capitalism’s “tendency to detach economic action from social context[].”8 For Max
Weber, the transferability of contractual rights is part of “that legal state of affairs
which is required by advanced and completely commercial social intercourse” and
“indispensable for a modern capitalistic society.”9 Echoing Weber, John R.
Commons claimed that “modern capitalism begins with the assignment and
negotiability of contracts.”10 The transferability of contractual rights is generally
thought of as an essential component of the prevailing economic regime. In
particular, permitting transferability allows the transferor to use its contractual rights
as collateral and hence serves the transferor’s interest by increasing its ability to
access credit. According to a leading contracts treatise, if most contract rights were
not assignable, our modern credit economy could not exist.11 The policy is felt most
strongly in the case of debts—that is, contractual obligations to pay agreed sums of
money.12 Contemporary market economies have long reached the stage where debt
is conceptualized as a kind of asset.13 The commodification of debt is a centuries-old
process, but it has reached new heights in recent years with the intense
financialization of modern economies.14 Nor is the process limited to debts: other
kinds of rights to sue for breach are also treated as marketable commodities.15

6. See W.S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the
Common Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1003 (1920) (“[T]he common lawyers saw as clearly as
the Roman lawyers that such rights of action were personal matters between these two
persons.”).
7. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 276 (2008)
(“[A]s English commerce and trade expanded, courts began to liberalize the rules that
prevented assignments of choses in action.”).
8. JŰRGEN KOCKA, CAPITALISM: A SHORT HISTORY 114 (2016).
9. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
681–82 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
10. JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 253 (1924).
11. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 11.2 (3d ed. 2004).
12. See 1 HENRY DUNNING MACLEOD, THE PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICAL PHILOSOPHY 481
(2d ed. 1872) (“If it were asked—Who made the discovery which has most deeply affected
the fortunes of the human race? We think, after full consideration, we might safely answer—
The man who first discovered that a Debt is a Saleable Commodity.”).
13. See generally Teemu Juutilainen, Law-Based Commodification of Private Debt, 22
EUR. L.J. 743 (2017).
14. See George M. Cohen, The Financial Crisis and the Forgotten Law of Contracts, 87
TUL. L. REV. 1, 10–16 (2012).
15. See Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 302 (2008)
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Although making contractual promises transferable might be regarded by some
as a symptom of moral decline,16 this Article does not seek to mount a general
critique of the transferability of contractual rights. Rather, it contends that courts and
legislatures have overestimated the arguments for transferability. While the
economic arguments to allow parties to opt in to assignability are powerful, the
economic arguments for forcing assignability upon them appear to be weak. The
law’s pro-assignability policy seems to be based either on circular conceptual
arguments that contractual rights are a form of property and must therefore be
transferable, or on simplistic instrumental arguments that predate the emergence of
sophisticated economic analysis of law. Grant Gilmore, a leading supporter of the
policy, admitted that his belief in it was “instinctive and irrational, not logical and
reasoned.”17 This Article contends that none of the available arguments is sufficient
to justify the law’s pro-transferability bias. In particular, the social benefits of
transferability are typically adequately factored into the initial contractual
negotiation. If transferability serves social welfare, then we can expect parties to
bargain for it or, at least, not to agree to a nonassignment clause.
Conversely, legal doctrine in its current form systematically underestimates the
reasons for restricting transfers of contractual rights. Contractual exchange, even
under capitalism, is very far from an impersonal affair. As the most sophisticated
contract-law scholarship stresses, parties to contracts combine legally enforceable
promises with nonlegal mechanisms based on trust, reciprocity, and social
sanctions.18 Legally enforceable contracts are typically embedded in a broader set of
relations between the parties. It is not feasible, or even possible, to make precise,
legally enforceable provisions for all contingencies. Parties often expect that, in a
spirit of give-and-take, the terms of their exchange will be adjusted and renegotiated
during performance. They fear, however, that the other party will exploit changed
circumstances. They know they cannot rely on courts to protect the full extent of
their interests, so they want the other party to be disposed towards cooperative
behavior.
As a result, the identity of one’s contractual counterparty is often crucial. Parties
choose their business partners based on prior experience with that party, on that

(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (objecting to majority’s decision that assignees for collection have
standing to sue and stating that “[t]he right to sue is now the exact opposite of a personal
claim—it is a marketable commodity.”).
16. Conceivably, Seana Shiffrin’s work on the divergence between promissory morality
and contract law might provide the basis of a moral critique of the law’s pro-transferability
bias. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 708 (2007). Shiffrin herself has stated that “generally, a promise is not simply
transferable” but says only that this typically the case. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Immoral,
Conflicting, and Redundant Promises, in REASONS AND RECOGNITION: ESSAYS ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF T.M. SCANLON 155, 164–65 (R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel
Freeman eds., 2011).
17. See 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §7.6, at 212
(1965).
18. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The
Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1392–94 (2010).
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party’s reputation for trustworthy and reasonable behavior, and on that other party’s
need to maintain a good reputation in the marketplace. Assignment may render the
duty holder liable to suit by someone with whom she has no experience and who has
no reputation for trustworthiness and reasonableness. The transferee may also be free
of reputational constraints that bound the transferor. The most extreme example is
assignment to a “vulture fund,” an entity with no incentive to be reasonable and with
every incentive to play “hardball” to develop an aggressive and fearsome reputation.
These considerations are essential to the way parties use contract law, and they
cannot be brushed aside with assertions that disregarding them will make it easier for
contractual right holders to obtain credit.19
The main purpose of this Article is to challenge contract law’s pro-assignability
policy. As things stand, the best explanation of the law’s transferability bias is that it
makes life easier for banks and other financial industry players, who have long had
an outsized influence on the making of American secured-transactions law.20 At the
very least, the aim of the Article is to provoke other scholars to produce a more
compelling justification for the policy than has previously been offered.21 For,
despite the topic’s obvious importance, the literature on the contemporary American
law of assignment is surprisingly slim. The assignability of tort and copyright claims
has attracted recent scholarly attention,22 and a few articles address assignability in
particular contractual contexts.23 But very few discuss the topic as a whole.24 The

19. But cf. Orkun Akseli, Contractual Prohibitions on Assignment of Receivables: An
English and UN Perspective, 7 J. BUS. L. 650, 654 n.23 (2009) (“[S]ometimes debtors do not
want to deal with new creditors who are not flexible in commercial relationships. However,
for the sake of lowering the cost of credit the law should have a pro-assignee stand.”).
20. See Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1785 (1994)
(detailing the influence of financial institutions on the drafting of U.C.C. Article 9).
21. In Section III.C below, I attempt to construct an argument in favor of the current law,
based on Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith’s argument for standardization in property law.
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
22. On the assignability of tort claims see, for example, Michael Abramowicz, On the
Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697 (2005); Andrew S. Gold, On Selling Civil
Recourse, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 485, 486–87 (2014); Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim,
64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011). On the assignability of copyright claims, see Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2277 (2013).
23. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen & William H. Henning, Freedom of Contract vs. Free
Alienability: An Old Struggle Emerges in a New Context, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 353 (2010)
(explaining U.C.C. Article 9’s mandatory assignment rule); Larry A. DiMatteo,
Depersonalization of Personal Service Contracts: The Search for a Modern Approach to
Assignability, 27 AKRON L. REV. 407 (1994) (discussing the assignability of rights and duties
in personal services contracts); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Correctly Interpreting Long-Term
Leases Pursuant to Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L.
REV. 751 (1988) (discussing the assignability of rights and duties under real property leases);
see also Stephen M. McJohn, Assignability of Letter of Credit Proceeds: Adapting the Code
to New Commercial Practices, 25 UCC L.J. 257 (1993) (discussing the assignability of rights
under letters of credit in the related context of Article 5 of the U.C.C.).
24. For example, brief discussions can be found in Henry E. Smith, Standardization in
Property Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 151 (Kenneth
Ayotte & Henry E. Smith, eds., 2011); Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85
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issue has attracted some attention among doctrinally oriented scholars of AngloCommonwealth commercial law in recent years,25 but this important aspect of
contract law rarely features in larger debates about the nature and purpose of the
institution.26 The few theoretical treatments of contract law to take notice of the
assignability rules accept those rules as given. Thus, Curtis Bridgeman uses the law’s
attitude to the transferability of contractual rights to criticize interpretive theories that
view contract law as a reflection of the moral obligation to keep one’s promises.27
“Allowing such transferability,” Bridgeman points out, “is at the least not required
by the moral obligation to keep one’s promises, and in fact requiring the promisor to
deliver performance to a stranger may go beyond what the morality of promising
would even allow.”28 Bridgeman does not question the justifiability of the
assignability rules; rather, he contends that this feature shows that contract law, as it
currently stands, is less concerned with promissory morality and more with
protecting “property-like” rights to performance.29 Bridgeman is right to note a
tension between certain conceptions of contract law and the assignability rules.
Because his aim is to interpret rather than to evaluate contract law, however, he does
not consider the possibility that the assignability rules might be rejected or changed.30

COLUM. L. REV. 970, 982–84 (1985); Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 54–55; J. E. Penner,
The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 802–03, 810–13 (1996).
One of the few papers to discuss the topic at length is unpublished. Jared G. Kramer, When
Should Contracts Be Assignable? An Economic Analysis (Aug. 15, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript) (available on SSRN) (discussing reasons parties to contracts would want to make
their contractual rights and obligations transferable and why they would wish to make them
nontransferable). In addition, some articles address the law of assignability indirectly. See
Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of Contracts,
111 MICH. L. REV. 715, 716, 722–28 (2013) (proposing theory of “bundled assignability” as a
function of legal entities); Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract
Theory, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1969, 1986–92 (1987) (comparing law of assignment to law of
undisclosed agency); Carl S. Bjerre, Project Finance, Securitization and Consensuality, 12
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 411, 423–27 (2002) (discussing Article 9’s effect on nonassignment
clauses in the context of international project finance).
25. E.g., GREG TOLHURST, THE ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS 119–322 (2d ed.
2016) (providing the most detailed doctrinal treatment of the Anglo-Commonwealth law); see
also Michael Bridge, The Nature of Assignment and Non-Assignment Clauses, 132 L.Q. REV.
47 (2016).
26. This may be because few scholars teach the material. The issue typically does appear
in contract law casebooks, but it is often relegated to the last chapter. See, e.g., IAN AYRES &
GREGORY KLASS, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 1159–77 (9th ed. 2017); CHARLES L. KNAPP,
NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1057–88 (8th ed. 2016); ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS,
CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 961–1027 (5th ed., 2013).
27. Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract
Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3013, 3031–32 (2007).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 3032–33.
30. In another recent contribution to the literature of contract-law theory, Erik
Encarnacion has similarly mentioned the possibility of assignment to build the case for a
conception of contracts as “commodified promises.” Erik Encarnacion, Contract as
Commodified Promise, 71 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2018). He contends that “contracts involve, and
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In Part I, this Article explores the reasons that parties to contracts might want to
make contractual rights transferable or nontransferable. Part II explains the current
law of assignability and its pro-transferability bias. Part III considers possible
justifications for this bias and finds none of them persuasive. Part IV explores what
the law would look like if freed from the policy in favor of transferability.
I.

WHY (NOT) MAKE CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS TRANSFERABLE?

While contract law scholars have had little to say about transferability, lawyers
who draft contracts have not been similarly reticent. Written contracts almost always
make some provision about assignment.31 Contracts sometimes make the rights they
create expressly assignable at the option of the promisee (or “obligee”),32 without the
need for the promisor (or “obligor”) to consent to the particular assignment.33 For
example, many contractual promises are made to the promisee and its assignees34 or
otherwise clearly contemplate transfer.35 On the other hand, many contracts
explicitly make rights nontransferable,36 or they restrict the promisee’s ability to

should involve, treating promissory rights and obligations as subject to market norms,
including norms permitting the purchase and sale of those rights and obligations.” Id. at 64.
For Encarnacion, commodification is not necessarily a bad thing, and it is a matter of degree.
Id. at 70. On his account, transferability is only the most extreme form of commodification;
even a nontransferable promise may be commodified if it was made in exchange for the
payment of money by the promisee. Id. at 75–76. Encarnacion mentions some reasons to make
promises nontransferable, but he does not explore the law’s approach to assignability in any
detail. See id. at 82–87.
31. Randall D. McLanahan, Assignment, Delegation, and Choice of Law Provisions in
Commercial Agreements, 57 PRAC. LAW. 15, 15 (2011) (“[A]lmost every commercial
agreement has something to say about the assignment of rights, the delegation of duties, or
both.”).
32. To be clear, this Article is concerned with transfers of contractual rights that empower
a transferee to assert rights and bring lawsuits directly against the promisor. It does not deal
with arrangements between a promisee and a third party that only transfer an entitlement to
the proceeds of performance after the promisor has rendered performance to the promisee.
33. The law also allows for consensual transfers of rights via novation, whereby the
parties to the contract agree to substitute a new party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 280 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). For the difference between assignment and novation see, for
example, 216 Jamaica Ave., L.L.C. v. S & R Playhouse Realty Co., 540 F.3d 433, 437 (6th
Cir. 2008).
34. See, e.g., Cafferty v. Scotti Bros. Records, 969 F. Supp. 193, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(discussing a contract granting license to promisee, its licensees, and assignees).
35. See, e.g., MacWilliams v. BP Prod. N. Am. Inc., No. Civ. 09-1844 RBK AMD, 2010
WL 4860629, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2010) (examining contracts providing that promisee “may
assign its rights under the agreements”).
36. See, e.g., Riley v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 36 F. App’x 194, 194–95 (6th Cir. 2002)
(“Unless otherwise agreed in writing by HP, Subcontractor shall not assign its rights or
delegate its responsibilities under this Agreement. Any purported assignment or delegation by
Subcontractor, including the attempted subcontracting of all or any portion of the work to [be]
provided under this Agreement, shall be null and void.”). For further examples of
nonassignment clauses from the case law, see infra Section II.C.
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transfer her rights to specified kinds of transferees or to particular circumstances.37
What bears on this choice? And how should the law respond where the parties have
made no explicit choice?
A. Reasons for Unilateral Transferability
The promisee will typically prefer to have the option of transferring her rights at
a later time without getting the permission of the promisor (who, after the contract is
concluded, might seek to hold the promisee to ransom). Some third party may value
the right higher than the promisee does, creating the possibility of a transfer that is
mutually beneficial for promisee and transferee. For example, a person holding a
concert ticket might be unable to make it to the concert or might decide, after buying
the ticket, that she no longer likes the performer. The ticket buyer would, in such
circumstances, prefer to have the option of selling the ticket to someone else who
values it more highly. To generalize: transfer may be beneficial because of postcontractual changes in circumstances or because of post-contractual realizations by
the promisee that she has misjudged the value that the right to performance holds for
her.
Much of the litigation on assignability, however, concerns rights to the payment
of money. Money is valuable to all, so the value of performance is less likely to
fluctuate due to a post-contractual change of circumstances or to be subjected to an
erroneous assessment. Transfer of a money claim to a third party may nevertheless
be advantageous for two main reasons: financing and debt collection.38
Financing provides a reason to transfer a right when the promisee needs money
now, but the promisor is not yet obligated to pay. A transferee might be willing to
provide cash now in exchange for the prospect of a later profit. To support a credit
transaction, a contractual right can be transferred using various legal techniques. The
right might be sold in its entirety to the transferee and enforced by her, as in the case
of factoring or securitization.39 In such cases, the risk of the promisor being unable
to pay usually falls on the transferee, and the sale price will include a discount to
reflect the transferee’s risk that the promisor will default on the obligation.40
Alternatively, the transfer might occur by way of security, whereby the transferee

37. See, e.g., Disk Authoring Techs. L.L.C. v. Corel Corp., 122 F. Supp. 3d 98, 102
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing a contract providing that either party could assign its rights
without the other party’s consent to a party acquiring substantially all of the assignor’s assets,
but otherwise restricting assignment without consent, such consent not to be unreasonably
withheld).
38. When determining the value of the transferred promise, the transferee may wish to
consider psychological research suggesting that the promisor is less likely to keep her promise
after it has been transferred to a third party. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the
Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547,
1580 (2011) (“The research I have presented here suggests that the assignment of a contract,
including securitization, may undermine the promisor’s commitment to performance.”).
39. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 133, 144 (1994) (explaining factoring and securitization).
40. Id. at 135 (“The risk that these payments may not be made on time is an important
factor in valuing the receivables.”).
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makes a loan to the promisee with the contractual right serving as collateral, as in the
case of accounts receivable financing.41 The transferee-lender can look to the
contractual right for satisfaction if the borrower defaults on the loan. In that case, the
transferee-lender aims to achieve a profit through interest payments by the promiseeborrower (at a rate that would be higher without the collateral).42 Either way, the
economic function of the transaction is the same: to provide the promisee with money
now rather than later.43
The most extreme form of this motivation for assignment is a sale of a whole
business or substantial parts of it.44 It is sometimes possible to achieve the same result
without transferring rights to another entity: functional ownership of a business can
be changed through the sale of stock in a corporation.45 But a sale of stock in the
whole company is not an appropriate mechanism when only part of the promisee’s
business is being sold to a particular buyer. Moreover, the parties may prefer to sell
the corporation’s assets rather than its stock for tax reasons.46 Thus, in many
circumstances, the preferred way to sell a substantial part of a business’s assets is by
transferring contractual claims to a new entity.
Another major reason for assignment is the desire to pass the burdens of disputing
and enforcement to someone else. Because they specialize in enforcement and
benefit from economies of scale, debt-collection companies can make a profit by
purchasing contractual rights at a price acceptable to the promisee, then recovering
higher sums from the promisor.47 Transferring a contractual right to debt collectors
may also serve the promisee’s reputational interests. Debt enforcement can have
harsh consequences, including the debtor’s bankruptcy, and others may judge that
the promisee has acted too harshly.48 Assignment may enable the promisee to escape

41. See Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy Quilt of Current Law and a
Proposal for Reform, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1068 (1992) (explaining accounts receivable
financing).
42. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1152–53 (1979) (borrowers offering collateral can
secure lower interest rates).
43. See Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor’s Perspective, 76
TEX. L. REV. 595, 605 (1998) (“Firms securitize their assets for the same reason firms borrow
money: to raise money for either special projects or working capital.”).
44. Additional reasons for assignment include the desire to move assets from one member
of a corporate group to another, either for tax avoidance or for corporate-efficiency reasons.
Thus, for example, it is common for international joint venture agreements to be transferable
to a subsidiary of an original party or to some other party controlled by the transferor. See
RONALD CHARLES WOLF, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES WITH
SAMPLE CLAUSES AND CONTRACTS 164–65 (3d ed. 2011).
45. See Ayotte & Hansmann, supra note 24, at 723–24.
46. Id. at 743 n.53 (noting that stock sales and asset sales have different tax
consequences).
47. See Kramer, supra note 24, at 2 (stating that businesses can often sell receivables to
debt collection firms, “who because of their specialization extract more value per cost of
servicing their accounts”).
48. See Arthur Allen Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite—The Dynamics of Coercive
Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 35–36 (1970) (discussing the different reputational concerns of
original creditors and debt collectors).
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this kind of reputational cost while effectively reaping the benefit of aggressive and
misleading conduct by the debt collector49—even though the promisee might have
transferred the right to a debt collector with full knowledge that the debt collector
would act in this way.50
B. Reasons Against Unilateral Transferability
On the other hand, the promisor would, other things being equal, typically prefer
that rights against her are not transferable without her consent. The reasons are
various.51 Some stem from sheer administrative convenience. A nonassignment
clause, if it is enforceable, leaves the promisor in no doubt to whom she owes her
contractual obligations. Promisors who pay an assignor after having received notice
of an assignment are at risk of having to pay the same debt twice.52 While the
requirement that the promisor receives notice of the assignment will generally
prevent this kind of error, mistakes are inevitable.53 In response to the possibility of
assignment, promisors may need to maintain a costly bureaucratic infrastructure to
keep track of whom it owes its debts to. 54 Further, the validity of a purported
assignment, particularly when the assignment is governed by foreign law, may be
difficult for the debtor to discern.55 And when there are multiple assignments, the
debtor may have to figure out which takes priority.56 For these reasons, the risk of
payment to the wrong party is described by one commentator—perhaps with some
exaggeration—as the “main reason” for contractual provisions barring transfers of
contractual rights.57
More generally, the identity of one’s contractual counterparty may be an essential
element of the deal. The point is more obvious when it comes to contractual duties,

49. The prevalence of aggressive and misleading debt-collection practices in the industry
prompted the passage of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p
(2012).
50. See Barb. Tr. Co. v. Bank of Zam., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 148 (Eng.) (explaining that
Bank of America was apparently unwilling to sue the central bank of a developing country
because of the reputational losses it would suffer in the context of widespread arguments in
favor of debt forgiveness. Instead, the bank transferred its claim to a vulture fund immune
from such reputational pressures); see also supra text accompanying notes 194–196.
51. See Roy Goode, Contractual Prohibitions Against Assignment, 2009 LLOYD’S MAR.
& COM. L.Q. 300, 303–04; Gerard McCormack, Debts and Nonassignment Clauses, 2000 J.
BUS. L. 422, 424–26.
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 338(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[T]he
assignor retains his power to discharge or modify the duty of the obligor to the extent that the
obligor performs or otherwise gives value until but not after the obligor receives notification
that the right has been assigned and that performance is to be rendered to the assignee.”).
53. See Hugh Beale, Louise Gullifer & Sarah Paterson, A Case for Interfering with
Freedom of Contract? An Empirically-Informed Study of Bans on Assignment, 2016 J. BUS. L.
203, 220.
54. See Kramer, supra note 24, at 4–5.
55. 1 GILMORE, supra note 17, at § 7.7.
56. Id.
57. LARRY A. DIMATTEO, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTING: LAW & PRACTICE 79 (4th ed.
2016).
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a matter dealt with not by the law of assignment but by the legally distinct topic of
“delegation.”58 It obviously matters who owes duties under a contract.59 What may
be less obvious is that the identity of a right holder may be similarly essential.60 Most
clearly, the content of the legal obligation sometimes changes with the identity of the
right holder. For example, the terms of an insurance policy typically depend on the
particular characteristics of the policy holder.61 An insurer will decide which risks it
is willing to cover and how much to charge as a premium, based partly on what it
knows about the policy holder and the likelihood of a claim.62 Similarly, the content
of a supplier’s duty to meet a right holder’s requirements could be changed radically
by the substitution of a different buyer with different requirements.63 Hence,
requirements contracts often prohibit assignment, though they may make an
exception for assignments whereby the transferee acquires the promisee’s entire
business.64
Promisors may also seek to make rights against them nontransferable so that they
can engage in price discrimination.65 A supplier of a good or service may wish to
charge different prices for the same product, for example, because some customers

58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 316 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“In this
Chapter rights are said to be ‘assigned’; duties are said to be ‘delegated.’”).
59. The original party subject to duties under the contract—say, a supplier of services—
is usually selected for its various qualities, most obviously an expected level of performance.
Likewise, a supplier extending credit will do so only to a creditworthy customer, or it may
charge a higher price to compensate for a greater risk of default. Transferring a duty away to
a less competent or less creditworthy duty holder might completely change the value of the
right. For this reason, unless the parties agree otherwise, it is not possible for a contracting
party to unilaterally absolve herself of a duty by transferring it to a third party. Id. § 318(3). It
is typically permissible, however, for a promisor to satisfy her own performance obligation by
nominating someone else to discharge it, id. § 318(1), unless the promisee has a substantial
interest in performance by the promisor herself, as in the case of an author’s obligation to write
a book, id. § 318(2).
60. Though this Article claims that the law does not sufficiently recognize the significance
of a right holder’s identity, it does not aim to show that a right holder’s identity is of such
pervasive importance as the identity of a duty holder. Cf. Kramer, supra note 24, at 15
(claiming that assignments of rights and delegations of obligations are “largely symmetrical”).
61. Id. at 54–56.
62. Id.
63. For an example from the case law, see Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing &
Heating Co., 128 A. 280, 283 (Md. 1925) (smaller ice-cream manufacturer attempting to
assign requirements contract to larger ice-cream manufacturer).
64. See, e.g., Supply Agreement Number: 99xxxx, for Purchase of Production Parts and
Non-Production Goods And Services Between A123 Systems, Inc. (Supplier) and Think
Global AS (Think), cl. 18 (2007), https://contracts.onecle.com/a123/think-global-supply-2007
-11-28.shtml [https://perma.cc/22WP-4KB8] (barring assignment of rights under a
requirements contract except in connection with a merger, consolidation, reorganization or
sale of all or substantially all assets).
65. Kramer, supra note 24, at 4; see also Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State
Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51 EMORY L.J. 1, 17 (2002) (“By preventing resales by
original buyers [of computer software], [nonassignment] terms allow licensors to price
discriminate between low-value and high-value users.”).
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may be willing to pay more than others.66 If a low-paying customer can assign its
rights to a high-paying customer, the assignment will serve as form of arbitrage that
undermines the purpose of the price-discrimination scheme.67 Relatedly, promisors
may wish to limit a secondary market in contractual rights for moral reasons. One
prominent example is the market for concert tickets.68 These tickets are often sold at
lower than market value to permit access to committed fans who could not afford the
market price, and they are either nontransferable or saleable only at face value. Free
assignability frustrates the promisor’s purpose.
Additionally, contractual rights and duties may be effectively intertwined. Thus,
if the promisee has transferred her rights to a transferee, the promisee’s own incentive
to perform her side of the bargain may be reduced.69 The promisor may also wish to
prevent transfer because it may have a continuing course of dealing with the
promisee—in such circumstances the promisor may wish to set off cross-claims that
it has against the promisee and thereby reduce or extinguish its indebtedness to the
promisee. If the promisee transfers the right and the promisor is notified of the
transfer, the promisor is limited in its ability to set off its cross-claims against the
promisee that accrue after notification.70 This may be crucial in the event of the
promisor’s insolvency. For example, the International Swaps and Derivative
Association’s (ISDA) 2002 Master Agreement, which governs over-the-counter
derivative transactions, generally prohibits the transfer of rights arising under it prior
to default.71
More generally, the identity of a right holder under a contract matters because
contracts do not enforce themselves. As civil recourse theorists have stressed, private
law confers powers to bring lawsuits to redress wrongdoings.72 Contract law leaves
choices about whether and when to start proceedings in the hands of the victims of
alleged wrongdoings or, sometimes, in those of their transferees.73 The person
holding the power to sue can choose to exercise it at the first opportunity, or to be
more lenient and attempt to reach an agreed solution in the event of an arguable
breach by the duty holder. As noted above, one major reason to transfer a right is that

66. Kramer, supra note 24, at 4.
67. Id.
68. Gregory M. Stein, Will Ticket Scalpers Meet the Same Fate As Spinal Tap Drummers?
The Sale and Resale of Concert and Sports Tickets, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) (“Some
performers may be reluctant to be the first to raise ticket prices dramatically and thus depart
from the prevalent pricing model, perhaps out of fear of being perceived as greedy.”).
69. McCormack, supra note 51, at 425.
70. U.C.C. § 9-404 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
71. Goode, supra note 51, at 302.
72. Nathan B. Oman, Why There Is No Duty to Pay Damages: Powers, Duties, and
Private Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 137, 139 (2011) (law of contract and tort “gives plaintiffs
the power to extract wealth from defendants but does not impose duties on defendants to
compensate those that they have wronged”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not
Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 721 (2003) (“In torts, the liability of a defendant to a
plaintiff is correlative to a power of the plaintiff against the defendant.”).
73. See Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual
Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529 (2011).

498

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:485

the transferee may be more willing, or in a better position, to pursue the promisor
through litigation or arbitration.74
On a simplistic view of the role of law in contracting, the expectation that the right
holder will not rush to court at the first opportunity is just that: a factual expectation
rather than a consideration relevant to legal analysis.75 This argument, however, does
not survive a collision with reality. As countless scholars of contract law have shown,
it is impossible to provide at the outset for every eventuality that might arise.76 When
circumstances change or transpire differently from how the parties envisaged, the
possibility of opportunism raises its head. Contract law has some tools for combating
such opportunism, but it does not attempt to enforce a generalized norm of fair
cooperation77—nor will the parties often wish for an adjudicator to try to enforce
such a norm.78 Courts and arbitrators face formidable difficulties in discerning
whether a contested action is opportunistic or, instead, is reasonably self-interested.79
Parties may thus prefer predictable and cheaper forms of adjudication, even at the
cost of losing out on attempts by the adjudicator to reach the “correct” result.80
In such circumstances, promisors are often fully aware that a promisee might have
a legally enforceable right that is not perfectly calibrated with considerations of
fairness or efficiency. For these reasons, and also because conducting litigation or
arbitration is expensive, parties to legally enforceable contracts will also rely on
alternative nonlegal mechanisms to induce cooperative behavior. 81 When, as so
often, it is not possible to use formal enforcement methods, contracting parties rely
on social sanctions to avoid opportunistic exploitation of changed circumstances.82
Most notably for present purposes, they use reputational mechanisms or informal
leverage to induce reasonable behavior.83

74. See supra text accompanying note 47.
75. E.g., Bridge, supra note 25, at 65 (“The obligor’s expectation of counting upon a
supine obligee is but a mere factual expectation unprotected by the law of contract.”). The
obligor may be counting less on a supine obligee than on a reasonable obligee, or one who
will exercise her discretion to enforce her obligations in accordance with good faith.
76. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (2003) (“All contracts are incomplete. There are infinite states of
the world and the capacities of contracting parties to condition their future performance on
each possible state are finite.”).
77. See Paul MacMahon, Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced Legal Norm,
99 MINN. L. REV. 2051, 2052–54 (2015).
78. Id. at 2093–95.
79. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 373, 392–93 (1990).
80. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1381, 1392 (2009) (“[P]arties may prefer contracts that only crudely encourage
efficient behavior but significantly reduce the contracting costs of enforcement”).
81. Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
847, 861 (2000).
82. Id.
83. Epstein, supra note 24, at 982 (“The promisee is a known quantity chosen and selected
by the promisor. Even if the legal system gives the promisor the same rights against the
promisee’s assignee, the value of those rights still may be reduced by the assignment [in part
because] [t]he promisor may not have any informal leverage against the assignee . . . .”).
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Knowing that the right holder’s identity matters, promisors select their partners
with care. These points are well summed up in a manual on construction contracts,
explaining the basis for including prohibitions on assignments: “[O]wners and
contractors choose whom to contract with on the basis of mutual expectations of
good performance and a co-operative attitude in the event of difficulties.”84 Or, as
one court has put it, “[b]uilding contracts are pregnant with disputes: some employers
are much more reasonable than others in dealing with such disputes.”85 As a result
of their complexity and the near inevitability of unforeseen circumstances,
construction contracts are sometimes thought of as paradigmatically “relational”
contracts.86 And the insight that formal contracts are complemented by nonlegal
methods is commonly and rightly attributed to relational contract theory. As Robert
Gordon famously noted, “[i]n the ‘relational’ view of Macaulay and Macneil, parties
treat their contracts more like marriages than like one-night stands.”87 Parties to
marriages are not indifferent to the identity of their spouses.
The attribution of these insights to relational contract theory might lead one to
underestimate their general acceptance among contracts scholars across the
ideological spectrum. While scholars may disagree about the right way to respond to
the facts, they generally agree that the picture painted by relational contract theory is
descriptively accurate.88 Further, the identity of a right holder is not significant only
in paradigmatically relational contracts like construction contracts.89 To a greater or
lesser extent, “all or virtually all contracts are relational.”90 The significance of the

84. ISSAKA NDEKUGRI & MICHAEL RYCROFT, THE JCT 05 STANDARD BUILDING
CONTRACT: LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 235 (2d ed. 2009).
85. Linden Gardens Tr. Ltd. v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd., [1993] 1 AC 85 (HL) 105
(appeal taken from Eng.).
86. Robert G. Eccles, The Quasifirm in the Construction Industry, 2 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 335 (1981); Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691,
760 (1974) (citing standardized construction contracts as examples of relational agreements);
Walter W. Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 295, 306–07 (1990) (citing construction contracts as an example of
network forms of organization).
87. Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power
in Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 569.
88. See Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil’s Relational
Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. 1175, 1200 (1992) (“To a significant degree, we are all
‘relationalists’ now.”); Scott, supra note 81, at 852 (“We are all relationalists now. In that
sense Macneil and Macaulay have swept the field.”).
89. See, e.g., P.G. Turner, Legal Assignment of Rights of Restricted Assignability, 2008
LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 306, 313 (“Grantors of contractual options to buy commercial
leases find it necessary to ensure that rivals and ill-reputed businesses do not become entitled
to exercise the options granted. Syndicates of banks (the viability of which may affect national
economies) find it important to have exclusive access to valuable long-term income streams.”).
90. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 805, 821 (2000); see also Scott, supra note 81, at 852 (“All contracts are relational,
complex and subjective.”); Symposium, Relational Contracting in a Digital Age, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 675, 679 (2005) (“I start from the proposition that all contracts of every
kind, are relational, and they all occur in relations. Even the most truncated ones you can think
of occur within relations.”) (quoting Ian R. Macneil at a panel discussion).
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right holder’s identity differs from contract to contract and will tend to vary
depending on the kind of contract under consideration. But a world where promisees
are generally indifferent to the identity of the persons who hold rights against them
is purely imaginary.
C. Party Choice Concerning Transferability
Promisors generally prefer non-transferability, while promisees prefer
transferability. Economic theory suggests that, in the absence of transaction costs,
parties to contracts will bargain to the position that maximizes joint value.91 Where
unilateral transferability benefits the promisee more than it harms the promisor, the
parties will agree on assignability—whereas if it harms the promisor more than it
benefits the promisee, the parties will agree on non-assignability.92 Through the
mechanism of bargaining, the benefit to one party of a chosen arrangement can be
shared with the other party; hence, a lender’s ability to transfer the benefit of the
contract to a third party should, in principle, result in a lower interest rate for the
borrower. Conversely, where a right holder agrees to non-transferability, she should
be able to bargain for a higher level of contractual performance than she would
otherwise be able to obtain. There is no general reason to think that transferability or
non-transferability is better: as in the case of so many other contractual terms, it
depends on the circumstances.
Having weighed the costs and benefits of assignability, the parties might prefer
various intermediate positions between full transferability and total nontransferability.93 They might agree to permit assignment to a certain class of
assignees but otherwise prohibit it.94 They might specify that assignment only to a
particular class of transferees is permitted. For example, they might want to prohibit
assignment except where the transferee is a member of the promisee’s corporate
group.95 In such cases, any harm to the promisor resulting from the assignment will
usually be minimal.96 As another example, a developing country borrowing money
from a bank might be happy to permit assignment to another bank but unhappy with
assignment to a vulture fund. 97

91. Kramer, supra note 24, at 2.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 17–22.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Stock Purchase Agreement by and among Yahoo! Inc. and Verizon
Communications Inc, § 8.02, (July 23, 2016), https://contracts.onecle.com/yahoo/verizon-spa
-2016-07-23.shtml [https://perma.cc/GP6T-ATDA] (“Neither this Agreement nor any of the
rights, interests or obligations hereunder shall be assigned, in whole or in part, by operation of
Law or otherwise, by Seller or Purchaser without the prior written consent of the other party
hereto; provided, however, that Purchaser may assign, at any time prior to the Closing, in its
sole discretion, any of or all its rights, interests and obligations under this Agreement to any
wholly owned U.S. Subsidiary of Purchaser . . . .”).
96. See Ayotte & Hansmann, supra note 24, at 723–24.
97. Barb. Tr. Co. v. Bank of Zam., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 148, [2007] 1 C.L.C. 434 (Eng.);
see also supra text accompanying notes 194–196.
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The parties might agree instead to allow assignment by consent of the promisor
but provide that the consent cannot be unreasonably or arbitrarily withheld.98 This
kind of provision allows a more fact-specific approach to assignability, because
assignability depends on the circumstances at the time of assignment, the identity of
the assignee, and so on. Allowing assignability to turn on reasonableness, a matter
that might have to be determined by a third party, is likely to create controversy and
unpredictability.99 But if the parties have chosen such a provision, we can generally
assume that they have weighed the costs of uncertainty against the benefits of a more
sensitive approach and have decided that the benefits of the provision exceed its
costs.
II. TRANSFERABILITY RULES AND THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENT
Though parties to contracts usually have their own ideas, the current legal regime
generally sides with transferability. There is now a strong presumption in favor of
the free assignment of contract rights.100 The current position is the product of
centuries of evolution. Medieval common law did not generally recognize
assignments of choses in action, including contractual rights; such rights were
considered inherently personal to the original parties.101 At a later stage, the law’s
reluctance to allow assignments was attributed to the legal prohibitions on champerty
and maintenance.102 Allowing assignments of contractual rights would, according to
Lord Coke, “be the occasion of multiplying . . . contentions and suits.”103 One
plausible explanation for the law’s extreme hostility to the transferability of
contractual claims is that it coexisted with the possibility of imprisonment for unpaid
debt: when the right holder has the ability to put the debtor in prison, the identity of
the right holder is of overwhelming importance.104
The common law’s initial hostility to transferability came under pressure from
business practice.105 First, to allow the transfer of obligations to pay money,
mercantile courts developed the institution of negotiable instruments.106 A negotiable
instrument is an unconditional promise, embodied in a document, to pay to the bearer
or to order a fixed sum of money either on demand or at a fixed time.107 The right to

98. Webb Interactive Services Master Software License Agreement, § 15.0,
https://contracts.onecle.com/webb/vetconnect.lic.shtml
[https://perma.cc/499R-LS2H]
(“Webb may not assign . . . its rights . . . under this Agreement, either in whole or in part,
without the prior written consent of Client, which shall not be unreasonably withheld . . . .”).
99. Kramer, supra note 24, at 21–22.
100. Khan v. Douglas Mach. & Tool Co., 661 F. Supp. 2d 437, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
101. Holdsworth, supra note 6, at 1003.
102. See id. at 1016–27.
103. Lampet’s Case, [1613] 77 Eng. Rep. 994, 997 (KB), 10 Co. Rep. 46 a, 48 a (Eng.).
104. Stanley J. Bailey, Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth
Century (Part III), 48 L.Q. REV. 547, 549 (1932).
105. Holdsworth, supra note 6, at 1021–22.
106. See J. MILNES HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH Law
(1955). On the contemporary law of negotiable instruments, see 2 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT
S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE chs. 16–21 (5th ed. 2000).
107. U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
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payment under a bill of exchange, promissory note, or check is transferred via a
process known as “negotiation” rather than assignment.108 Once courts accepted
freedom of contract as a general principle, the case for recognizing the transferability
of negotiable instruments was strong. The promisor or issuer of a negotiable
instrument is on fair notice that she is opting in to a scheme of rules for the transfer
of rights to subsequent holders.109 The common law recognized the transferability of
negotiable instruments, but only after commercial interests struggled to convince
judges influenced by a “precommercial” mindset.110
Leaving negotiable instruments to one side, the law’s policy moved from
prohibiting the assignment of contractual rights to allowing it through a series of
steps in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. At least from the late
seventeenth century,111 courts of equity would give effect to a purported assignment,
particularly where the right in question was a debt claim.112 Where the assigned right
was enforceable in the common-law courts, as in the case of a debt, a court of equity
would grant an injunction, requiring the assignor to lend his claim in the commonlaw courts on the assignee’s behalf, and would restrain the assignor from recovering
payment of legal debts on his own behalf.113 Common-law courts then acquiesced in
the reform by permitting assignees to conduct litigation in the assignor’s name.114
Finally, as part of reforms to pleading practice in the nineteenth century, American
legislatures allowed the assignee to sue in its own name without having to join the
assignor as a party.115
Contemporary law, however, does not just allow assignability—it favors it. Part
II of the Article explains the current law on assignability, showing that (a) there is a
general default rule of assignability, (b) exceptions to the general default rule have
been narrowly curtailed, (c) attempts by parties to displace the general rule of

108. Id. § 1-201(b)(21) (definition of “negotiation”); see 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
106, at 72 (“One policy [behind Article 3’s narrow concept of negotiability] is to put persons
who deal with negotiable instruments on notice of their negotiability. Many business people
and some consumers appreciate the unique legal liabilities associated with negotiable
instruments and conduct their affairs accordingly.”).
109. The position of the transferee of a negotiable instrument is often significantly stronger
than the position of the original promisee: in particular, the holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument generally takes free from defenses and claims that could have been asserted against
a previous holder. See 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 106, at 168–69. Unlike the simple
fact of transferability, the holder in due course doctrine is less obvious to signatories, and the
rule has been abrogated for many consumer debts so as to preserve the rights of consumers.
16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2019).
110. For an account of the nineteenth-century American history of negotiability, see
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 253–66
(1979) (arguing that the rise of negotiability in nineteenth-century American law reflected the
triumph of commercial interests over a “precommercial” mindset).
111. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. L. REV.
816, 821 (1916).
112. Holdsworth, supra note 6, at 1020–21.
113. TOLHURST, supra note 25.
114. Id.
115. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 11.2; Garrard Glenn, The Assignment of Choses in
Action; Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser, 20 VA. L. REV. 621, 623 (1934).
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assignability are often deprived of that effect by narrow judicial construction, and (d)
many rights are mandatorily assignable regardless of what the parties agree.
A. General Default Rule of Assignability
Courts considering assignability issues often start by saying that “[i]n general, all
contracts are assignable.”116 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts likewise begins
with a presumption of assignability: “A contractual right can be assigned” unless
some exception to this general rule applies.117 Contractual rights, then, are usually
transferable even without any express agreement to that effect. Though the identity
of a person entitled to assert rights might be considered one of the most basic terms
of a contract, the general rule of assignability is seemingly not conceived of as an
implied term.118 Rather, it is a rule of law that the parties may try—and, as we will
see below, often fail—to dispense with by agreement.
There is, moreover, no exception for bad faith or malicious assignees. As an
illustration, consider C.H. Little Co. v. Caldwell Transit Co.,119 where the promisee
under a contract of carriage assigned its contractual rights to the promisor’s direct
competitor. The promisor offered to prove to the court that the whole purpose of the
assignment was for the competitor to drive the promisor out of business.120 The court,
however, considered this allegation irrelevant.121 Another particularly egregious
example is Fitzroy v. Cave,122 a nineteenth-century English case still cited in all three
leading American treatises on contracts.123 Fitzroy and Cave were two company
directors who disagreed over how the corporation should be run. Fitzroy, having
learned that Cave owed money to some tradesmen in Ireland, persuaded the
tradesmen to assign their rights against Cave to Fitzroy. Fitzroy frankly confessed
that he had no financial interest in the suit: indeed, by agreeing to turn over the
proceeds of any suit to the tradesmen, he was acting as a free debt-collection agency.
He flatly admitted to the court that his motivation in suing Cave was to force Cave
to declare bankruptcy, which would disqualify him from serving as a director of the

116. Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 394 n.7 (Tex. App. 1997); see also, e.g.,
Elliott Assocs.. L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F. Supp. 1203, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“contracts
are freely assignable in the absence of ‘clear language expressly prohibiting assignment’”).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also
U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“Unless otherwise agreed
all rights of either seller or buyer can be assigned except where the assignment would
materially change the duty of the other party, or increase materially the burden or risk imposed
on him by his contract, or impair materially his chance of obtaining return performance.”).
118. Cf. Bridge, supra note 25, at 54 (contending that assignability must be conceived of
as a term of the contract).
119. 163 N.W. 952 (Mich. 1917).
120. Id. at 953.
121. Id. at 954.
122. [1905] 2 KB (CA) 364 (Eng.). For near-contemporary criticism of Fitzroy v Cave, see
Percy H. Winfield, Assignment of Choses in Action in Relation to Maintenance and
Champerty, 35 L.Q. REV. 143, 150–51 (1919).
123. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 11.4 n.10; 17 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 74:55 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS]; 9 MURRAY, supra
note 4 § 49.

504

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:485

corporation. The assignee’s motive, however, was considered irrelevant, and the suit
was allowed to proceed.
Like many other decisions to be discussed in this Part, Little and Fitzroy are hard
to square with a party-focused approach to assignability. In neither case did the
parties make any explicit provision allowing assignability. But had the parties to the
original contracts discussed the matter, the promisors would never have agreed to
allow the promisees to assign their rights to an enemy.124 The courts, however, having
embraced the general idea of assignability, seemed unable to countenance an
exception despite the assignees’ obvious bad faith.125
B. Truncating Exceptions to the Assignability Default
The general rule of assignability is not completely without exception, even where
the parties do not seek to prohibit assignment. In addition to nonassignment clauses,
considered below, some assignments are ineffective because they are contrary to
public policy; others are ineffective because they would materially change the
promisor’s duty. These exceptions, however, are severely limited.
1. Public Policy
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Restatement (Second)”) notes that a
contractual right may be unassignable where “assignment is forbidden by statute or
is otherwise inoperative on grounds of public policy.”126 For example, claims against
the federal government are generally unassignable.127 Almost all states have statutory
restrictions on the assignment of future wages as a paternalistic measure to protect
workers.128 Future social security payments are also unassignable129 for the same
reason. Assignments of unearned entitlements to salaries by public officials are often
prohibited by statute; such rules are sometimes justified on the ground that
assignment would undermine the public official’s incentive to discharge his or her
duties.130 Claims for personal injury and death are generally unassignable, so a right

124. Contracts do sometimes explicitly prohibit the assignment of rights to the promisor’s
direct competitors. See, e.g., Exhibit 4.21 Loan & Security Agreement, 36–37, 2018 WL
01710385 (Apr. 10, 2018).
125. Fitzroy was decided just ten years after Bradford Corp. v. Pickles, [1895] AC 587
(HL) (appeal taken from Eng.), the case generally regarded as establishing that an otherwise
lawful exercise of legal rights could not be considered unlawful because of bad motive. Id. at
601 (“If the act, apart from motive, gives rise merely to damage without legal injury, the
motive, however reprehensible it may be, will not supply that element.”). One of the judges in
Fitzroy v. Cave, Cozens-Hardy LJ, was losing counsel in Bradford Corp. v. Pickles.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
127. 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (2012) (providing that assignments of claims against the federal
government “may be made only after a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided,
and a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued,” with the exception of assignments to
“financing institutions” of claims worth at least $1,000).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 15, statutory note (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“Virtually every state has statutory restrictions on the assignment of wages.”).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2012).
130. Fox v. Miller, 121 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tenn. 1938); see also Swenk v. Wyckoff, 20 A.
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to sue for medical malpractice may be unassignable even if it can be framed as a
breach-of-contract claim.131
These public-policy limitations are relatively narrow, particularly in comparison
to historical limitations based on the prohibitions on maintenance (interfering in
another’s dispute) and champerty (interfering in another’s dispute for profit). These
prohibitions were once considered sufficiently strong to justify barring almost all
assignments. But the idea that it is wrong to interfere in another’s dispute is
anachronistic: much of what the modern legal profession does would be covered, to
say nothing of litigation funding.132 In the United States, this limitation on
assignment was severely curtailed at an early stage.133 Occasionally, defendants seek
to invoke similar ideas in contemporary litigation. In the late 1990s, for example, the
Peruvian government sought to resist an action by a “vulture fund” that had acquired
some of Peru’s sovereign bonds.134 The Peruvian government invoked a nineteenthcentury statutory provision of New York law stating that “[n]o person . . . engaged
directly or indirectly in the . . . collection and adjustment of claims . . . shall solicit,
buy or take an assignment of . . . any claim or demand, with the intent and for the
purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon.”135 Read literally, this
provision would bar all assignments where the assignee contemplated having to bring
legal action to enforce the debt. This statute, however, had been interpreted by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1882 to permit assignments for the purpose of debt

259, 260 (N.J. 1890) (“If the officer should be deprived of this support, there would arise a
hazard of his being driven to an inappropriate meanness of living, of his being harassed by the
worry of straightened circumstances, and tempted to engage in unofficial labor, and of the
likelihood of his falling off in that official interest and vigilance which the expectation of pay
keeps alive.”).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 15, statutory note (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
132. See Sebok, supra note 22. While this Article contends that the law is, in some respects,
too willing to allow assignability, it does not support a revival of maintenance and champerty
as limitations on assignment. While these doctrines would limit assignment, they would do so
in the wrong way. In particular, they would prevent assignment even if the parties had
explicitly opted in to assignability. As the Second Circuit pointed out in Elliott Associates,
L.P., v. Banco de la Nacion, interpreting section 489 to bar all assignments made in
contemplation of debt collection would have harmed developing countries by removing the
option of consenting in advance to suit by assignees in these circumstances, thereby reducing
their ability to access debt financing. 194 F.3d 363, 380 (2d. Cir. 1999).
133. Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 68 (1935). Elsewhere
in the common law world, this exception to assignability survives, though, like many aspects
of the law of assignability, its scope is unclear. In England, where champerty and maintenance
still present an exception to assignability, an assignment of a “bare cause of action” is invalid,
but the rule has no application where the assignee has a “genuine commercial interest” in
receiving the assignment. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (HL)
(appeal taken from Eng.). The scope of the exception to assignability has, moreover, been
narrowly curtailed by rulings holding that the exception does not affect the assignment of debt
claims. Camdex Int’l Ltd v. Bank of Zam. (No. 1) [1996] QB 22 (AC) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
134. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).
135. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 2004).
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collection.136 Reaffirming that holding and rejecting the Peruvian government’s
argument, the Second Circuit cited “New York’s interests as a global financial
center” in support of a narrow construction of Section 489.137 Section 489 has
recently been held to bar assignments where the purpose is simply for the assignee
to bring a lawsuit as a proxy for the assignor,138 but even in such cases, the statute
does not apply to assignments where the purchase price is $500,000 or more.139
2. Material Change of Promisor’s Duty
The main exception to the default rule of assignability is the idea that some
assignments would harm the promisor by making a significant difference to her duty
under the contract.140 The Restatement (Second) provides that assignment is not
permissible where the assignment would “would materially change the duty of the
obligor, or materially increase the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or
materially impair his chance of obtaining return performance, or materially reduce
its value to him.”141 Sometimes, this limitation is expressed by saying that the right
is “personal” to the original promisee.142 On this basis, courts have sometimes found
the buyer’s right under a requirements contract to be unassignable: a promise by A
to supply B with its requirements for a particular good is not generally understood as
a promise to supply C’s requirements.143 Likewise, courts have generally found the
employer’s rights under a personal services contract to be nonassignable: “the law is
clear that an employee cannot be compelled to work for another company.”144
Employers wishing to preserve this right must expressly provide for it—for example,
with a clause permitting assignment on the sale of an entire business. 145

136. Moses v. McDivitt, 88 N.Y. 62, 65 (1882).
137. Elliott, 194 F.3d at 379.
138. See Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB AG, 65 N.E.3d 1253, 1256 (N.Y. 2016).
139. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489.
140. This exception to assignability is presumably itself a default rule that can be
overridden by contrary agreement that a right is assignable; the Restatement (Second) provides
that a clause providing for assignability is valid. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 323(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Cohen, however, appears to treat it as a mandatory rule,
suggesting that it might be applied even in cases where the parties have provided for express
assignability. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 28–29.
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2)(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981); see also
U.C.C. § 2-210 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (similar wording); Hess v.
Gebhard & Co., 808 A.2d 912, 922 (Pa. 2002) (“[A]n assignment of a right will not be effective
if it purports to make a material change in the duties or responsibilities of the obligor.”).
142. See Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Heating Co., 128 A. 280, 283 (Md.
1925) (explaining the contractual promise to supply buyer’s requirements for ice is not
assignable from a smaller ice-cream manufacturer to a larger ice-cream manufacturer).
143. Id.
144. E.g., Logical Networks, Inc. v. Murdock, No. 239779, 2002 WL 31187877, at *2
(Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2002).
145. Kramer, supra note 24, at 28–32. Even without an express assignability clause, a court
might recognize an implied exception to the default rule that an employer’s rights are
nonassignable in cases of sales of whole businesses. See Roeder v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc.,
No. 103CC0497, 2003 WL 21976388, at *4 n.1 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 11, 2003) (“[A]nother
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Crucially, however, the material-variation exception does not apply where the
promisor’s objection is simply that the transferee is likely to wield the power to sue
more aggressively than the promisee would. In particular, “[w]hen the obligor’s duty
is to pay money, a change in the person to whom the payment is to be made is
ordinarily not material.”146 Courts seem to universally reject arguments that a change
in the creditor’s identity materially increases the burden on the promisor147—even
though, in reality, the creditor’s identity may be all-important.148 As explained above,
where the original promisee might have been willing to renegotiate the extent of
payment or provide extra time in response to changed circumstances, the transferee
may be unwilling to do so.149 This idea was similarly rejected when gas station
franchisees objected that assignment of the franchisor’s rights would create an
increased risk that the transferee would exercise discretion under the contract to
enlarge the franchisees’ obligations. 150 The Seventh Circuit ruled that the change in
the right holder’s identity was irrelevant because the original franchisor would have
had the legal right to do exactly the same thing.151 The Restatement (Second) provides
that “if the duty is to depend on the personal discretion of one person, substitution of
the personal discretion of another is likely to be a material change.”152 But it does not
accept that, in reality, the decision to enforce a contractual right always depends on
the right holder’s discretion.153
C. “Strict Construction” of Nonassignment Clauses
In theory, aside from the mandatory rules considered in Section II.D below, courts
respect the parties’ freedom of contract on the issue of assignability.154 But in fact,

exception to the general rule against assignability of professional services contracts is when
an employment contract is assigned in conjunction with the sale of a business and assets: such
an assignment is deemed incident to the property conveyed.”).
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 317 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
147. See, e.g., Craft Works Const., Inc. v. Nest, No. Civ. A. RE-03-012, 2003 WL
22765942, *2 (Me. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2003) (explaining the right to payment under
construction contract could be assigned despite absence of assignment clause because identity
of payee is not material to the promisor’s obligation); In re FH Partners, L.L.C., 335 S.W.3d
752, 764 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (“There is simply no Texas authority holding that a creditor’s
right to receive payment on a debt is the sort of contractual right that Texas law regards as
being predicated on a debtor’s ‘personal trust . . . or credit’ in a creditor, such that the creditor
cannot freely assign that right.”); Easton Bus. Opp. v. Town Exec. Suites, 230 P.3d 827, 830
(Nev. 2010) (“When the obligor’s duty is to pay money, a change in the person to whom the
payment is to be made is not ordinarily material and there is nothing extraordinary about the
assignment of commission rights here.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
148. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 25–30 (making a similar point with respect to the
assignability of mortgage contracts).
149. See supra Section I.B.
150. Beachler v. Amoco Oil Co., 112 F.3d 902, 908 (7th Cir. 1997).
151. Id.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 317 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
153. See supra Section I.B.
154. Contractual freedom to restrict assignability was recognized in the eighteenth-century
case of Lynch v. Dalzell, in which the court gave effect to a restriction in an insurance policy
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freedom of contract bends decidedly in one direction. The Restatement (Second)
provides that the parties may make rights expressly assignable.155 Conversely,
although the Restatement (Second) states that assignment may be “validly precluded
by contract”156 and concedes that “the parties to a contract have power to limit the
rights created by their agreement,”157 the Restatement’s provision on contractual
prohibitions on assignment is largely devoted to providing ways for courts not to
apply nonassignment clauses.158 The Restatement took its cue from the U.C.C.,159
which in turn followed the case law—in the 1960s, Grant Gilmore noted that “[i]n
case after case where a commercial debtor has sought to prohibit assignment, the
courts have regularly managed to construe the heart out of the clause before them.”160
While courts “recit[ed] by dictum that a no assignment clause is good, [they would]
hold that in this case no intent to forbid the assignment appears.”161
The Restatement (Second) justifies the pro-transferability interpretive approach
by reference to “the policy which limits the validity of restraints on alienation.”162
Even aside from Article 9’s mandatory provisions, the rule that contract rights are
assignable is a “sticky default,” or perhaps better, a “quasi-mandatory rule.”163 This
policy inspires a series of what public law scholars would call “normative canons.”164
The upshot is that the plain language of a nonassignment clause is a poor predictor
of its legal effect.165

that restricted rights to the original policyholder. (1729) 2 Eng. Rep. 292; 4 Bro. P.C. 431.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 323(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) (“A term of
a contract manifesting an obligor’s assent to the future assignment of a right or an obligee’s
assent to the future delegation of the performance of a duty or condition is effective despite
any subsequent objection.”).
156. Id. § 317(2).
157. Id. § 322 cmt. a.
158. The provision is entitled “Contractual Prohibition of Assignment,” but lists four
different default rules that restrict the scope of contractual prohibitions. Id. § 322.
159. See id. § 322 reporter’s note (noting that section 322(1) was “based on” a similar
provision in U.C.C. Article 2).
160. Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J.
1057, 1118 (1954).
161. Id. Gilmore, an opponent of restrictions on assignment, thought the courts’ treatment
of nonassignment clauses illustrated the idea “that a rule, universally conceded to be ‘the law,’
is almost never applied suggests that courts must instinctively feel that it is a bad rule, from
which avenues of escape must be discovered and maintained.” 1 GILMORE, supra note 17, at
210–14.
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
163. On “sticky defaults” or “quasi-mandatory rules,” see generally Ian Ayres, Regulating
Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2084–96 (2012).
164. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64 (2008).
165. See, e.g., Caleb Trotter, Be Wary of Over-Reliance on AIA Form Contracts, MOD.
CONTRACTOR SOLUTIONS, Aug. 2016, at 36, 37 (warning construction contractors that they
may be liable to suit by a party whom “[they] never worked for or knew,” despite a seemingly
clear antiassignment clause in the American Institute of Architects (AIA) standard form
contract).
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1. Requiring “Magic Words” to Remove the Power to Assign
Intuitively, one might expect that a nonassignment clause would prevent
assignment from occurring. Under the “modern approach,” however, courts
generally construe nonassignment clauses to impose a duty on the promisee not to
assign the contract, but will not deprive the promisee of the power to do so.166 Section
322(2) of the Restatement (Second) provides that “[a] contract term prohibiting
assignment of rights under the contract, unless a different intention is manifested . .
. (b) gives the obligor a right to damages for breach of the terms forbidding
assignment but does not render the assignment ineffective.”167 This means that even
if the contract explicitly states, for example, that the promisee “shall not assign” its
rights, many courts would find that an assignment is nevertheless effective to transfer
the right to sue to the assignee unless the word “void” or “invalid” appears.168 Some
courts have taken this interpretive canon to extreme lengths.169 For example, in
Rumbin v. Utica Mutual Insurance Company, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
construed a clause that stated “[n]o payment under this annuity contract may be . . .
assigned” so as to preserve the power to assign.170
Construing a nonassignment clause to preserve the power to assign essentially
renders the clause ineffective.171 True, the promisor can still sue the promisee for
damages for breach of contract, but it will almost always be impossible to prove the
extent of a promisor’s loss resulting from the transfer.172 Moreover, the remedy of
damages will generally be useless in the event of the promisee’s bankruptcy.173 A

166. Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526, 533 (Conn. 2000).
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(b) (Am. Law. Inst. 1981).
168. Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 856 (2d Cir.
1997) (“[T]o reveal the intent necessary to preclude the power to assign, or cause an
assignment violative of contractual provisions to be wholly void, [a contractual] clause must
contain express provisions that any assignment shall be void or invalid if not made in a certain
specified way.” (alteration in original) (quoting Univ. Mews Assocs. v. Jeanmarie, 471 N.Y.S.
2d 457, 462 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983))).
169. Not all courts require “magic words”; the Supreme Court of Minnesota, for example,
has rejected this approach and interpreted a clause stating that “the rights . . . of [the parties]
shall not be assignable” as removing the power to assign. Travertine Corp. v. LexingtonSilverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 272, 274 (Minn. 2004) (emphasis omitted). The decision in
Travertine has been criticized on the ground that it “den[ies] Minnesota citizens the benefits
of the modern majority rule requiring strict construction of non-assignment clauses.” Joy
Anderson, Case Note, Contracts—Looking for “Something”: Minnesota’s New Rule for
Interpreting Anti-Assignment Clauses in Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1435, 1437 (2006).
170. 757 A.2d 526, 529 (Conn. 2000) (alteration in original).
171. 1 GILMORE, supra note 17, at § 7.9 (construing prohibitions on assignments as mere
personal covenants is “more a tribute to judicial ingenuity in avoiding results sensed to be
undesirable than to judicial skill in unveiling the true intent of the parties”).
172. See Anderson, supra note 169, at 1460 (noting that “the obligor often will not be
quantifiably harmed by an assignment”).
173. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that
limiting the promisor to a damages remedy in that case would have rendered it a general
creditor of a bankrupt entity).
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damages remedy is clearly inadequate to protect the obligor’s interests, yet many
courts are willing to refuse the equivalent of a specific performance remedy by
finding the assignment invalid. The practice can hardly be justified as an attempt to
give effect to the words chosen by the parties to embody their agreement; rather, it
is a fairly transparent attempt to achieve a policy result by the use of normative
canons of interpretation.
The “modern view” trips up even the most sophisticated contract drafters. In one
construction case, the parties had used a standard-form contract provided by the
American Institute of Architects (AIA), which contained a clause stating that neither
party “shall assign the Contract.”174 The AIA made the “classic mistake” of failing
to include the magic words denoting voidness or invalidity,175 and the clause was
therefore read to preserve the power to assign.176 The treatment of nonassignment
clauses appears to be an exception to Robert Scott’s claim that “[t]hrough the process
of common-law adjudication, these industry-wide prototypes [including the AIA’s
standard forms] have received plain meaning legal recognition, thereby reducing the
risks associated with their use by subsequent contracting parties.”177
2. Construing “Assignment” as “Delegation”
As the Restatement (Second) itself makes clear, the word “assignment” refers to
a transfer of rights to a third parties, whereas the word “delegation” refers to the
performance of a duty by a third party.178 Given this terminological clarification, one
might think that if the parties agreed that the contract shall not be assignable, the
court would understand the parties to have intended to bar assignment. Nevertheless,
many courts will construe such a clause as an attempt to bar only the delegation of
duties but not the assignment of rights.179 This practice is approved by the
Restatement (Second), which provides that “[u]nless the circumstances indicate the
contrary, a contract term prohibiting assignment of ‘the contract’ bars only the
delegation to an assignee of the performance by the assignor of a duty or
condition.”180 The U.C.C. has an almost identical provision,181 but it also provides

174. Oliver/Hatcher Const. & Dev., Inc. v. Shain Park Assocs., No. 275500, 2008 WL
2151716, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 22, 2008).
175. Id. (quoting SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA
DOCUMENTS, § 23.19, p 485 (4th ed. 2000)).
176. Id. at *4.
177. Scott, supra note 82, at 870.
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 317–318 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
179. Aldana v. Colonial Palms Plaza, Ltd., 591 So. 2d 953, 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(“As a rule of construction . . . a prohibition against assignment of the contract (or in this case,
the lease) will prevent assignment of contractual duties, but does not prevent assignment of
the right to receive payments due . . . .”); Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F. Supp. 2d
939, 943 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (“The modern trend with respect to contractual prohibitions on
assignments is to interpret these clauses narrowly, as barring only the delegation of duties, and
not necessarily as precluding the assignment of rights from assignor to assignee.”) (emphasis
omitted).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
181. U.C.C. § 2-210(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
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that “[a]n assignment of ‘the contract’ . . . is an assignment of rights.” 182 There could
hardly be a clearer illustration of policy-motivated interpretation: the same word
means different things depending on whether the court is interpreting a clause
seeking to prohibit assignment or whether a party has actually purported to achieve
an assignment.
3. Permitting Assignments of Money Claims
The default construction of a contractual prohibition on assignment, according to
the Restatement (Second), “does not forbid assignment of a right to damages for
breach of the whole contract or a right arising out of the assignor’s due performance
of his entire obligation.”183 The idea is that parties are more likely to wish to restrict
transfer of rights to performance than they are to wish to restrict claims for damages
for breach. Likewise, a change in the identity of the right holder is less significant
when the promisor’s only obligation is to pay money for work already done: “[I]t
should make no difference to [the promisor] whether [the promisee] or an assignee
sues to recover money allegedly owed under a fully performed contract.”184
Drawing a distinction between assignments at different stages of a contract’s life
often makes sense. In an insurance contract, for example, the insurer’s decision to
cover the relevant risk and its decision about the premium to charge are usually based
on information the insurer has gathered about the applicant. Evidently, it would
undermine the whole arrangement if the original insured had the power to transfer
the policy itself to another person, whose risk profile may be different from the
original holder.185 Post-loss assignments, however, do not alter the likelihood of the
covered risk occurring, so the insurance company has less reason to wish to avoid
assignment.186 The courts have recognized this distinction, and as a result, “[t]he
great weight of authority distinguishes between assignment of an insurance policy
before loss occurs and assignment after loss.”187
While it may make sense for the parties to distinguish between assignments before
and after breach, it is at least highly questionable whether the courts should impose
this distinction where the parties have not explicitly selected it. As an illustration, in

182. See id. § 2-210(5).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). E.g.,
SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 674 (Utah
2001) (“As a general rule, a contract provision prohibiting the assignment of the contract itself,
or of rights and privileges under the contract, does not, unless a different intention is
manifested, prohibit the assignment of a claim for damages on account of breach of the
contract.”); Berschauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 994
(Wash. 1994) (“[A] general anti-assignment clause, one aimed at prohibiting the assignment
of a contractual performance, does not, absent specific language to the contrary, prohibit the
assignment of a breach of contract cause of action.”).
184. Omicron Safety and Risk Techs., Inc. v. Univ. Chi. Argonne, LLC, 181 F. Supp. 3d
508, 511 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
185. 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 123, § 49:126.
186. Id.
187. Antal’s Restaurant, Inc. v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 680 A.2d 1386, 1388 (D.C.
App. 1996); see also Millard Gutter Co. v. Farm Bureau Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 889 N.W.2d
596 (Neb. 2016).
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one case, a contractor and project owner agreed that neither party would assign “this
Contract” without the prior written consent of the other party.188 The contractor then
assigned its claims for breach of contract against the project owner to a bank.189 The
project owner found itself on the receiving end of an arbitration claim by the bank
and pointed to the seemingly unlimited nonassignment clause in an effort to resist
the claim.190 The court, however, ruled that the nonassignment clause did not prevent
“post-contract assignment of the related chose in action”;191 because “restraints on
alienation of property should be strictly construed against the party urging the
restriction.”192 This process of strict construction must seem like mere legal verbiage
to a project owner who reads the actual text of the contract.
4. Permitting Assignment by Another Name
Another way, approved by the English courts, for promisees to evade a
prohibition on assignment is for the assignor to declare itself a trustee of the claim it
has against the obligor.193 This subterfuge was approved in Barbados Trust Co. v.
Bank of Zambia.194 The case concerned a loan to the government Bank of Zambia in
1985; the loan documents permitted the lender to assign its rights only to another
bank or financial institution.195 As the trial court judge pointed out, “[a]ny borrower,
but particularly a central bank, may be concerned to ensure that its affairs and
obligations are known and owed to and only enforceable by established and
authorised institutions.”196 The purpose of the clause, it appears, was to prevent
assignment to vulture funds. Like American courts, the English courts nominally
purport to honor freedom of contract in this area, stating that there is “no policy
reason why a contractual prohibition on assignment of contractual rights should be
held contrary to public policy.”197 The Bank of Zambia must have felt confident that
it could not be liable to suit by vulture funds.
Nevertheless, a majority of the judges in the Bank of Zambia case agreed that the
nonassignment clause did not prevent a bank holding the right—in this case, Bank
of America—from evading the clause by declaring that it was a trustee of its debt
claim for a vulture fund. The court reached this conclusion on the basis of the “true
construction” of the clause: if the parties had wished to bar declarations of trust in

188. Missouri Bank & Trust Co. v. Gas-Mart Dev. Co., 130 P.3d 128, 134 (Kan. Ct. App.
2006).
189. Id. at 130.
190. See id. at 132 (“[The project manager’s] motion framed the issue as whether the
construction contract's express prohibition on assignment precluded the assignment of the
contractor's right, title, and interest in the arbitration proceedings.”).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 134.
193. See Don King Prods. Inc. v. Warren [2000] Ch 291 (CA) 388 (Eng.).
194. [2007] EWCA (Civ) 148 (Eng.).
195. Id. at 434.
196. Id. at 438.
197. Linden Gardens Trust Ltd. v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd. [1994] 1 AC 85 (HL)
107 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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addition to assignments, they should have done so explicitly.198 Yet the same judges
agreed that as the beneficiary of a trust, the vulture fund could bring an action directly
against the Bank of Zambia, just as an assignee could.199 As a dissenting judge
pointed out, the effect of this construction was to permit precisely the same legal
result—liability to suit by a vulture fund—that the clause was meant to prevent.200
While the majority’s reasoning was nominally tied to contract interpretation and
party intent, it was clearly motivated by hostility to prohibitions on assignment.201
D. Mandatory Assignability Rules
Assignability is also promoted by explicit mandatory rules. In the nineteenth
century, the newly widespread ability to assign contractual rights was coupled with
an understanding that the parties could choose to make rights nonassignable if they
so wished. In the early twentieth century, however, many courts embraced the notion
that attempts to restrict the assignability of debt claims must be disregarded.202 This
change in the law appears to have been prompted by the rise of accounts-receivable
financing, whereby a business uses claims against its customers as collateral to obtain
a loan. In addition to common-law development, changes in financing practice also
prompted state legislatures to enact statutory provisions declaring certain classes of
debt assignable regardless of party agreement.203
Today’s mandatory assignability rules are contained mostly in the U.C.C., first
published in 1952 and eventually adopted throughout the United States. Under
U.C.C. Article 2, in a contract for the sale of goods, “a right to damages for breach
of the whole contract or a right arising out of the assignor’s due performance of his
entire obligation can be assigned despite agreement otherwise.” 204 This provision
converts the canon of construction, discussed in Section II.C.3 above, into a
mandatory rule, but only for sales-of-goods contracts. Article 9’s mandatory
assignability rules are of broader significance. Following their revision in 2001, these
rules are “horribly complicated”;205 a relatively brief description will suffice for
present purposes.206

198. Bank of Zam., [2007] EWCA (Civ) at 451–52 (Waller LJ).
199. The right of a beneficiary of a trust to bring an action against the obligor was
established in Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident Ins. Corp. [1933] AC 70 (PC) 79 (appeal taken
from B.C.).
200. Bank of Zam., [2007] EWCA (Civ) at 477–78 (Hooper LJ, dissenting).
201. One of the majority judges stated that “[i]f a prohibition on assignment carried all
before it . . . it seems to me that the public interest in freedom of contract and the freedom of
markets could be severely prejudiced.” Id. at 470 (Rix LJ).
202. An article published in 1934 stated: “So available is a debt for assignment, that if the
originating contract should forbid the assignment of the obligation when it has taken form, the
majority rule is that the stipulation is unenforceable.” Glenn, supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined., at 622.
203. See 1 GILMORE, supra note 17, at 308.
204. U.C.C. § 2-210(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
205. 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 106, at 382.
206. For a more detailed account of the revisions to Article 9’s provisions on nonassignability, see Cohen & Henning, supra note 23.
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Article 9 primarily concerns security interests in personal property, but it also
applies to many other kinds of transaction whose purpose is financing. Hence, the
original Article 9 covered not only transactions granting security interests but also
outright sales of “accounts” and of “chattel paper.”207 The initial bar on
nonassignment clauses, former section 9-318(4), provided that “[a] term in any
contract between an account debtor and an assignor is ineffective” in two
circumstances.208 First, a term would be ineffective if it prohibited assignment of an
“account,” whether by sale or as a security.209 Due to the definition of “account,” the
provision’s main effect was to invalidate attempts to restrict the assignability of
rights to payment for goods and services rendered.210 Grant Gilmore—a Co-Reporter
for Article 9 and evidently the driving force behind this explicit incursion on freedom
of contract—explained that its purpose was to support accounts receivable
financing.211 Secondly, a term was ineffective if it prohibited the creation of a
security interest in a “general intangible for money due or to become due.”212 Clauses
restricting the outright sale of general intangibles involved neither a prohibition on a
sale of an account nor the creation of a security interest, and were thus exempt from
the ban.213
Further changes in commercial practice led to a perceived need to expand the bar
on restrictions of assignability. In particular, the rise of securitization meant that
much financing was achieved through sales of receivables not covered by former
Article 9’s definition of “account,” including credit-card receivables, insurance
premiums, and rights to payment on energy contracts.214 Hence, revised Article 9
greatly expanded the definition of “account” and now contains two complex
provisions affecting restrictions on assignment.
The first restriction in revised Article 9—section 9-406—is a hard rule that simply
invalidates contractual restrictions on the transfer of accounts (other than health-care
receivables) and chattel paper. 215 The new definition of “account” includes almost
any right to payment other than under a loan.216 Section 9-406 also invalidates
contractual restrictions on the creation of security interests in “payment intangibles”
and promissory notes.217 The second provision—section 9-408—applies to
restrictions on the transfer of health-care receivables and to outright sales of payment

207. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1972) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010).
208. Id. § 9-318(4) (1972) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010).
209. Id.
210. The original U.C.C. defined “account” as “any right to payment for goods sold or
leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper not
yet earned by performance.” Id. § 9-106 (1962) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
amended 2010).
211. Gilmore, supra note 160, at 1118–21.
212. U.C.C. § 9-318(4).
213. See Cohen & Henning, supra note 23, at 358.
214. Id. at 360; Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A
Brief History, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 167, 174–76 (1999).
215. U.C.C. § 9-406(f) (2005) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010).
216. Id. § 9-102(2) (2005) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010); see
Cohen & Henning, supra note 23, at 360–61.
217. U.C.C. § 9-406.
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intangibles, health-care receivables, and promissory notes.218 This provision renders
restrictions on assignment ineffective to the extent that they would “impair the
creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest” but, unlike section 9-406, it
is not binding on the promisor, who can continue to pay the promisee.219 Under
section 9-408, unless the promisor agrees to pay the assignee, the assignee is limited
to asserting its interest against the proceeds of the assignment once they have been
paid to the promisee. Because it preserves the promisor’s ability to assert a
contractually agreed restriction on assignment, section 9-408 does not bear directly
on the main issue addressed by this Article. Section 9-406 is, however, a direct
interference with freedom of contract.
Some state laws have extended mandatory assignability even beyond the U.C.C.’s
already-broad scope. In the 1970s, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma declared “any
contract provisions which prohibit or restrict the assignability of accounts or contract
rights to be contra to the law, and thus null and void and of no effect.”220 By statute,
Arkansas law provides that “[a]ll bonds, bills, notes, agreements, and contracts, in
writing, for the payment of money or property, or for both money and property, shall
be assignable.”221 Arkansas courts ruled that this provision requires administrators
of employee-benefit plans that are covered under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) to honor assignments of insurance claims by plan beneficiaries
despite provisions in the plan preventing assignment.222 To that extent, the federal
courts later ruled that the Arkansas statute was preempted by ERISA.223
While the United States seems to have been the world leader in overriding
restrictions on assignment, many other jurisdictions have adopted similar mandatory
rules. As noted above, the English courts have bent over backwards to validate
assignments in the teeth of nonassignment clauses,224 and the U.K. government has
recently enacted regulations invalidating clauses purporting to restrict the assignment
of receivables.225 The perceived need to override freedom of contract extends beyond
common-law jurisdictions. In Germany, a 1994 law renders ineffective attempts to
restrict the assignment of claims resulting from reciprocal commercial
transactions.226 Moreover, to meet a perceived need for international uniformity to
facilitate cross-border assignability, two international conventions have been drafted,
and each includes a restriction on freedom of contract. The Ottawa Convention on
International Factoring contains an optional provision overriding nonassignment

218. Id. § 9-408 (2005) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010).
219. Id. § 9-408(a), (d).
220. Am. Bank of Commerce v. City of McAlester, 555 P.2d 581, 585 (Okla. 1976).
221. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-58-102 (West 2011).
222. Am. Med. Int’l v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 773 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Ark.
1989).
223. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir.
1991).
224. See supra Section II.C.4.
225. See Business Contract Terms (Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2018, SI
2018/1254 (Eng. & N. Ir.).
226. Hugh Beale & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Transfer of Rights and Obligations, in THE
COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW IN CONTEXT: INTERACTIONS WITH ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAW
540 (Gerhard Dannemann & Stefan Vogenauer, eds., 2013).
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clauses, and three countries (France, Latvia, and Belgium) have decided to sign up
to the Convention but opt out of the override.227 The U.N. Convention on the
Assignment of Receivables in International Trade similarly contains an optional
provision that overrides restrictions on assignment. 228
III. POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PRO-TRANSFERABILITY POLICY
The law’s policy of encouraging—and sometimes demanding—transferability is
thus well entrenched. But what, if anything, justifies it? Professor Gilmore, who was
largely responsible for Article 9’s prohibitions on nonassignment clauses,229 seemed
unable to explain it. “To rehearse social and economic arguments designed to prove
that the position is sound would not be helpful. On propositions of so fundamental
an order, belief is instinctive and irrational, not logical and reasoned.”230 Gilmore did
gesture towards an instrumental argument in favor of his position, stating that “[t]he
social or economic utility of permitting creditors to transfer rights is believed to
outweigh the utility of permitting obligors to forbid the transfer.”231 But the claim
that the utility of transferability outweighed the utility of promisors able to prevent
it “lies beyond demonstration and proof.”232 The purpose of Part III is to figure out
whether any such demonstration might be available now, especially given advances
in the economic analysis of law since Gilmore’s discussion, which was published in
1965.
Modern economic analysis supports a general presumption in favor of enforcing
contract terms as agreed: assuming the parties know their own desires, enforceability
generally makes them better off, without making anyone worse off.233 Yet contract
law properly contains some mandatory rules (with which parties cannot dispense by
agreement) and quasi-mandatory rules (with which parties can only dispense by
agreement with difficulty).234 Within the economic framework, there are two main
potential justifications for mandatory or quasi-mandatory rules: (i) to protect the
interests of a party to the contract (paternalism); and (ii) to protect the interests of
third parties (externalities).235 A pro-assignability rule might be justified as a
paternalistic step to help promisees or as an externality-minimizing measure to
protect the interests of transferees and potential transferees.

227. Status—Unidroit Convention On International Factoring (Ottawa, 1988), UNIDROIT,
https://www.unidroit.org/status-1988-factoring [https://perma.cc/3WMW-BDTF].
228. See N. Orkun Akseli, The United Nations Convention on the Assignment of
Receivables in International Trade and Small Businesses, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW
REFORM: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PRACTICE (Louise Gullifer & Orkun Akseli, eds., 2016).
229. 1 GILMORE, supra note 17, at 211
230. Id. at 212.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 212–13.
233. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 223 (6th ed. 2012)
(“Economic efficiency usually requires enforcing a promise if the promisor and promisee both
wanted enforceability when it was made.”).
234. Ayres, supra note 163.
235. Id. at 2084.
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To the extent judges and scholars have tried to justify the law’s transferability
bias, they have focused more on externalities than on paternalism, but both potential
bases for overriding nonassignment clauses might be relevant. As outlined below,
early justifications for the pro-transferability bias made a simple analogy between
contractual rights and tangible property.236 Behind this conceptual argument lies the
intuition that restricting the transfer of contract rights is economically wasteful.
Simplistic externality-based arguments237 refer solely to the interests of transferees
in being able to acquire contractual rights. More sophisticated externality-based
arguments in favor of transferability might rely on a general market interest in
reducing information costs for potential transferees.238 Finally, paternalism-based
arguments have recently surfaced, as defenders of receivables financing seek to
invoke the interests of small-business promisees in transferring their rights to
financial institutions.239
A. Contractual Rights as “Property”
The simplest version of the argument against enforcing nonassignment clauses
goes as follows. Contract rights are property.240 The law limits the extent to which
parties to contracts can restrict the alienation of other kinds of property.241 Likewise,
the law must limit restraints on the alienation of contractual claims.242
In the United States, this idea was given its most prominent expression by Justice
Holmes in his opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court in Portuguese-American Bank v.
Welles.243 The case concerned a construction contract with a prohibition on the
assignment of payment rights without the promisor’s consent. The promisee
nevertheless purported to assign the payment rights. When the promisee entered
bankruptcy proceedings, the assignee sought to claim priority over the proceeds of
the debt. The nonassignment clause was evidently inserted for the promisor’s benefit
and, as it turned out, the promisor was happy to pay either the promisee or the

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.D.
The assertion also appears in more qualified, less objectionable, forms. See, e.g., E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §11.1, at 745 (1982) (“Since a contract right is one kind of
property, many of the rules governing its transfer are similar to the rules of property law
governing the alienation of land and chattels.”); SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 26, at 1004 (“An
executory contract is a valuable property right, and, as with most such rights, it is (within
certain limitations) transferable to third parties.”).
241. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4 (AM.
LAW. INST. 1983).
242. Glenn, supra note 115, at 623 (“It requires a statute to impair that freedom of transfer,
which is part of the concept that a chose in action is really ‘property’ and, being such, is by its
very nature assignable.”).
243. 242 U.S. 7 (1916). A decade earlier, an English judge had expressed the same idea,
claiming that “a debt must be regarded as a piece of property capable of legal assignment in
the same sense as a bale of goods.” Fitzroy v. Cave, [1905] 2 K.B. 364 (CA) 373 (Eng.).
Fitzroy, did not involve a nonassignment clause. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes
122–125.
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assignee. The assignee had a strong case that the nonassignment clause was simply
irrelevant to the dispute over the proceeds of the debt.244 Justice Holmes’s
pronouncements in favor of the assignee’s position, however, went well beyond the
context in which the dispute arose. He stated that a debt is “property in the hands of
the creditor” and that it was “not illogical” to treat it like a chattel.245 In the same way
that a contract for the sale of a horse cannot restrain the future alienation of the horse
in the buyer’s hands, he said, a contract cannot restrain the future alienation of claims
to debts arising under that contract.246
Holmes is right to say that it is “not illogical” to treat a debt claim as being
relevantly similar to a horse. But it is also “not illogical” to treat it differently from
a horse. In more famous writings, Holmes himself stressed the limits of this kind of
logical claim in law.247 Legal rules are determined less by syllogism than by “[t]he
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow men.”248 In Portuguese-American Bank, however, Justice Holmes does
not elaborate on the underlying reasons, felt necessities, theories, or prejudices that
had motivated judges to move all the way from the idea that debt claims could not
be assigned to an approach that all debt claims must be assignable. Presumably, the
underlying idea is that the reasons for ensuring the alienability of rights in tangible
property apply with the same force to in personam contractual claims. Yet contractual
claims are at least potentially different from tangible property in multiple respects.
For example, as an English judge has pointed out, “[i]n the case of real property there
is a defined and limited supply of the commodity . . . . But no such reason can apply
to contractual rights: there is no public need for a market in choses in action.”249
There are at least two problems with the use of the property idea to justify the
law’s pro-transferability policy. First, it is not the case that categorizing a right as
“property” means it must be alienable without restriction.250 Second, even if property
is, by necessity, transferable, it is not clear that contractual rights are property rights
in the relevant sense of the term. The argument that contract is property thus assumes
what it seeks to establish: that contractual rights are transferable. Calling contractual
rights property in this context is therefore more of a rationalization or a rhetorical
flourish rather than an independently significant idea. Later courts and commentators
have generally abandoned it—the Restatement (Second), for example, states that
proprietary reasoning has “limited application” to contractual rights.251

244. See 1 GILMORE, supra note 17, at § 7.8.
245. Portuguese-Am. Bank, 242 U.S. at 11.
246. Id.
247. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1882).
248. Id.
249. Linden Gardens Trust v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd., [1994] 1 AC 85 (HL) 107
(appeal taken from Eng.).
250. E.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985).
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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B. Protecting Transferee Interests
The analogy to property law’s rules on alienation suggests that the protransferability policy might be based on an externalities rationale. Certainly, the
content of contract law may be affected by the interests of third parties. Where, for
example, a contract inflicts a harm on a third party, it might be made criminal or
unenforceable, or it might be interpreted in such a manner as to avoid harm to the
third party.252 It would be a stretch to say that the decision of the parties to create a
nontransferable right “harms” a potential transferee. Still, if a contractual right is
nonassignable, its lack of assignability makes the person who would otherwise
acquire that right worse off than she otherwise would be. And indeed, mandatory
assignability is sometimes justified on the simple ground that it will improve the
position of transferees of contractual rights. This seems to be what defenders of the
policy of free assignability mean when they say, for example, that the policy “go[es]
to the root of freedom and sanctity of contract which are cornerstones of market
based economies,”253 or that “lenders and assignees who engage in legitimate and
useful business operations should be protected and such lenders and assignees are
potentially at risk from nonassignment clauses.”254
The weakness of this argument is that it gives no systematic reason to favor the
interests of potential transferees over those of promisors who wish to avoid being
liable to such a transferee. And where the parties have agreed to a nonassignment
clause, there is a systematic reason to think that the transferee’s interest is weaker.
To the extent that making a right transferable will increase the value of that right,255
the interests of a transferee who would be willing to purchase it are already
represented in the contractual negotiation. The promisee, anticipating potential gains
from the transfer, has an incentive to bargain for transferability.256 If the parties to
the contract nevertheless agree on non-transferability, the fact that someone else
would prefer the right to be transferable is not a genuine externality.257
Non-transferability could, however, harm a transferee in another way. If nontransferability comes as a surprise, the transferee might have paid money to the
promisee in the erroneous belief that the right was transferable, and it may now find
itself unable to recoup its money. But if the purported transferee knows or could have
readily discovered that the right is transferable, its interests are adequately protected.
Consider Bank of America, N.A. v. Moglia, which concerned an attempt to grant a

252. Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 212 (2015) (arguing
that “[t]extual ambiguity should be resolved to avoid compromising the legally-recognized
interests of third parties”).
253. Akseli, supra note 19, at 662.
254. McCormack, supra note 51, at 426. McCormack is reciting, rather than embracing
this argument.
255. See supra Section I.A.
256. Cf. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 30 (“The costs [of idiosyncratic property rights]
to potential successors in interest will … be mediated through the price mechanism.”).
257. Beale, Gullifer, and Paterson support the nullification of nonassignment clauses by
saying that such clauses “seem to have an effect on receivables financing that is out of
proportion to the benefits that the [nonassignment clause] will bring to the customer.” Beale,
Gullifer & Paterson, supra note 53, at 229. The basis for this comparative judgment is unclear.
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security interest in assets held on trust for the corporation’s executives.258 The
contract between the corporation and the trustee stated:
[The] Trust Corpus . . . shall remain at all times subject to the claims of
the general creditors of [the corporation]. Accordingly, [the corporation]
shall not create a security interest in the Trust Corpus in favor of the
Executives, the Participants [a term that apparently refers to retired
executives] or any creditor.259
Despite this clear prohibition, the corporation nevertheless purported to create a
security interest in favor of Bank of America. Because the clause did not contain the
“magic words,” discussed in Section II.C.1 above, the bank argued that the clause
should be interpreted to preserve the assignability of the right.260 However, unlike
many other jurisdictions, Illinois law does not require “magic words” to convince the
court that a right is nonassignable.261 The Seventh Circuit thus gave effect to the
nonassignment clause and refused to recognize the bank’s security interest in the
trust.
The court in Moglia had little sympathy for the bank’s attempt to evade the
nonassignment clause. Judge Posner pointed out that the bank “knew, if it bothered
to read the trust agreement along with the other documents that defined [the
corporation’s] assets, as it should have done and no doubt did do, that the security
interest it was acquiring would not cover the . . . trust.”262 The bank was thus not in
a position analogous to that of a good-faith purchaser without notice of the
restriction. Moreover, “if the recipient’s purchaser knows exactly what he is (not)
getting, a refusal to enforce the restriction merely confers a windfall on him.”263 The
Moglia case was governed by Illinois law; had it been governed by the law of a state
adopting the “modern view,” the bank would have gained precisely such a windfall.
C. Increasing Liquidity by Reducing Information Costs
The Moglia case suggests a way for the externalities argument to be stated in a
more compelling form. It illustrates that if the parties to contracts are free to
determine whether or not the rights they create are transferable, a potential transferee
is required to check whether or not the right it seeks to acquire is transferable. As
Max Weber noted, “[a]dvanced trade . . . needs not only the possibility of transferring
legal claims but also, and quite particularly, a method by which transfers can be made
legally secure and which eliminates the need of constantly testing the title of the
transferor.”264 The problem with contractually agreed restrictions on alienation, the

258. 330 F.3d 942, 942 (7th Cir. 2003).
259. Id. at 946 (fourth alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
260. Id. at 946 (“[The bank] argues that Illinois law . . . will enforce a contractual
antiassignment provision . . . against an assignee only if the provision states that the assignor
has no power, and not merely no right, to assign.”).
261. See, e.g., In re Nitz, 739 N.E.2d 93, 96, 101 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000)
262. Moglia, 330 F.3d at 948.
263. Id.
264. MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 122 (Max Rheinstein, ed. 1967).
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argument might go, is that their very possibility makes it costly for potential
transferees to determine whether or not a given contractual right is subject to such a
restriction. This rise in transaction costs means that even where the parties do seek
to create a transferable right, efficient transfers may not occur because potential
transferees find it too costly to verify that they are transferable. This may be what
defenders of the pro-transferability policy mean when they refer to the “argument
about liquidity and cost of credit and the need for the workings of private law to
foster the former and lower the latter,”265 or when they say that it is “important that
legal rules based on freedom of contract do not impair the free flow of intangibles in
the stream of trade.”266
The argument seems to have appeared only in a terse, intuitive form, but it might
draw support from recent work on the economics of property rights by Merrill and
Smith.267 Merrill and Smith explain why freedom of contract does not and should not
always prevail in the creation of property rights. The law of estates in land, for
example, limits the parties to a fixed list of possible interests: fee simple, defeasible
fee simple, life estate, and lease. In explaining why property rights, unlike contract
rights, are restricted to a limited number of standardized forms, Merrill and Smith
suggest that “[t]he root of the difference . . . stems from the in rem nature of property
rights: When property rights are created, third parties must expend time and resources
to determine the attributes of these rights, both to avoid violating them and to acquire
them from present holders.”268 In making the case for the law to insist on
standardized bundles of rights, Merrill and Smith stress the informational advantages
for three classes of persons: potential duty holders, potential transferees, and other
market participants dealing with similar kinds of assets. 269 Crucially, Merrill and
Smith contend that those who create property rights lack adequate incentive to
conform to the optimal standard-form bundles of rights.270 Accordingly, the law
limits party choice by only permitting a closed list or numerus clausus of property
rights to bind third parties.
The information-cost considerations explored by Merrill and Smith are
undoubtedly relevant to the transferability of contractual rights. For one thing, the
original parties to a contract will often themselves wish to reduce information costs
for third parties by opting in to standard-form transferable contracts—for example,
in financial markets.271 Moreover, Merrill and Smith contend that some form of
legally mandated standardization prevails in the law of assignment. While the parties
are free to customize the terms of the contract, promisees appear not to be able to

265. Akseli, supra note 19, at 652.
266. Goode, supra note 51 at 300.
267. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21. see also Smith, supra note 24, at 148.
268. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 8 (emphasis omitted).
269. Id. at 27–28.
270. Id.
271. The need for standard terms in investment markets was noted by Karl N. Llewellyn,
What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 721 (1931). For a more
recent discussion, see Kenneth Ayotte & Patrick Bolton, Covenant Lite Lending, Liquidity,
and Standardization of Financial Contracts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
PROPERTY LAW 174 (Ayotte & Smith eds., 2011).
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create complex forms of ownership in contractual rights.272 In assignment, the
assignee “steps into the shoes” of the transferor and becomes something like a fee
simple owner. The law does not recognize complex forms of future interest in
contractual rights. This simplification relieves non-parties of the burden of grasping
an extra layer of complexity, though they must still “process” the contract terms
themselves.273
To this, Merrill and Smith might have added that the law recognizes a second
standard form of transfer for contractual rights to payment: the negotiable
instrument.274 By choosing to embody a promise to pay in the recognized form, the
parties opt in to a set of transfer rules, including one that precludes the promisor from
raising claims and defenses that it would have against the promisee. The transferee
of a negotiable instrument who qualifies as a holder in due course does not simply
step into the shoes of the promisee: her position may be better, because the right to
payment does not depend on whether the promisee has done what is necessary under
the contract to earn the right to payment. This feature of negotiable instruments
greatly economizes on information costs: the transferee need not concern herself with
the contents of the contract or the relationship between the promisor and promisee.
Information-cost concerns, however, seem unlikely to justify the current law’s
mandatory and quasi-mandatory rules in favor of transfer. First, information costs
are so significant in property law because the rights in question are rights in rem.
Contractual rights, by contrast, are typically rights in personam corresponding to
duties owed by a single person. The class of parties potentially affected by confusion
is thus smaller: it is essentially limited to potential transferees of the right and to
others dealing in similar assets. 275 Moreover, it is usually not difficult to discern
whether a contractual right is subject to a nonassignment clause: such clauses are
easily discoverable by a quick review of the contractual text.276 To understand what
she might be acquiring, a potential transferee of a contractual right will typically wish
to inspect the contract anyway.277
Moreover, as Merrill and Smith stress, the law’s aim is not to standardize property
rights but to encourage the optimal degree of standardization.278 Limiting party

272. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 55; see also Smith, supra note 24, at 151.
273. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 55.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 111–115.
275. Contractual rights also entail tortious duties in third parties not to intentionally induce
the promisor to breach the contract, but these duties add little by way of information costs to
third parties because they apply only where the third party is aware of the contract. See Smith,
supra note 24, at 151.
276. Richard Calnan, Ban the Ban: Prohibiting Restrictions on the Assignment of
Receivables, 3 J. BUTTERWORTHS INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 136 (2015). Admittedly, under
current law, it is often difficult to predict whether an assignment is permissible, but most of
this uncertainty derives from the refusal of many (but not all) courts to give nonassignment
clauses their conventional meaning. See supra Section II.C.
277. See Beale, Gullifer & Paterson, supra note 53, at 219 (presenting empirical evidence
that financial institutions in England considering taking assignments of receivables search the
supplier’s contracts for nonassignment clauses, but also for other kinds of problematic
clauses).
278. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 38 (“[W]hat we want is not maximal
standardization—or no standardization—but optimal standardization.”).
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choice economizes on information costs, but it increases “frustration costs” by
preventing the parties from doing what they wish. Merrill and Smith contend that
these frustration costs are not so great in the case of a numerus clausus of rights in
rem.279 The numerus clausus rarely stops parties from doing as they wish; rather, it
makes it more difficult or costly to achieve their goals, requiring them to combine
the standardized building blocks of property law.280 The equivalent position in the
area of assignability would be for the law to channel the parties into a limited number
of permissible forms or “boxes,” some of which would permit assignability and some
of which would not.
By contrast, the law’s insistence on mandatory assignability entails large
frustration costs. Parties who wish to make rights, falling within the scope of these
rules, nontransferable appear to have no way of achieving their aim. Supporters of
mandatory transferability sometimes contend that the harm of overriding a
nonassignment clause is minimal—especially where the promisor’s duty is simply to
pay money.281 Such arguments underestimate the significance and breadth of reasons
that promisors wish to avoid transfer.282
To the extent that the law’s policy is expressed in quasi-mandatory rules, one
might say that these simply raise the cost of achieving the parties’ goals: one can
often restrict transferability if one finds and pays a lawyer with knowledge of the
canons of construction deployed by many courts. Still, the effect of these quasimandatory rules is often to frustrate party intention. The modest information-cost
savings to be gained from relieving transferees of the burden of looking at contracts
and finding nonassignment clauses seem unlikely to outweigh the large frustration
costs inflicted on parties who wish to restrict transfer but are unable to do so—and
in particular, on those who reasonably but wrongly believe that they have done so.
D. Paternalism for Promisees
While most attempts to defend compulsory transferability focus on externalities,
some recent arguments focus on the interests of promisees. Defenders of bans on
nonassignment clauses, for example, speak generally about the need for businesses
to obtain credit using their contractual rights as security or collateral for loans.
Allowing a nonassignment clause to take effect “may increase the cost of credit” to
the promisee who has agreed to it.283 Over time, the promisee may become concerned
that the promisor will become insolvent and may wish to shift the risk to a transferee
in exchange for a lower recovery.284 To be sure, this possibility gives a concerned
promisee reason to bargain for the insertion of an express assignment clause or, at
the least, to refuse to agree to a nonassignment clause.

279. See id. at 55–57.
280. See id. at 55.
281. For example, Kramer argues that the cost of bare rights to payment does not vary with
the other party’s conduct, and suggests that this consideration supports Article 9’s mandatory
assignability rule. Kramer, supra note 24, at 57–58.
282. See supra Section I.A.
283. Akseli, supra note 19, at 662.
284. Id. at 662–63.
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Again, however, any systematic analysis must weigh the advantages of
transferability against the economic benefits that accrue to the promisor from a valid
nonassignment clause. The advantages of transferability do not alone provide any
general reason to think that promisees who wish to have the power to assign their
rights cannot adequately protect themselves by bargaining for assignability. Where
the parties have chosen to prohibit assignability, we can generally assume that the
benefit to the promisor of keeping the contractual relationship between the original
parties exceeds the benefit to the promisee of being able to transfer rights to someone
else.
An argument based on the interests of promisees, then, must provide a special
justification for contract law to depart from its usual assumptions and to engage in a
form of paternalism. Along these lines, in recent debates outside the United States,
mandatory assignability rules have sometimes been justified with reference to the
needs of small-business promisees. Recent efforts to introduce a mandatory
assignability rule for receivables in the United Kingdom have been largely justified
on this basis.285 The “small-business” rationale has also been used to support the U.N.
Convention on Assignment of Receivables in International Trade,286 even though the
Convention applies only to cross-border financing transactions to which small
businesses are unlikely to be parties.287
Inequality of bargaining power between businesses is not generally considered a
sufficient reason to invalidate contract terms.288 So why might nonassignment
clauses be singled out for such treatment? As far as I am aware, supporters of
mandatory assignment rules have not addressed this question. But they might argue
that promisees who would be harmed by nonassignment clauses are systematically
unlikely to consider cases outside the usual run of contractual performance between
two parties.289 Moreover, nonassignment clauses usually form part of standard form
contractual documents. In some instances, it may be because nonassignment suits the
interests of powerful purchasers of goods and services who have the power to require
suppliers to agree to a barrage of terms.
Still, it is unlikely that the current mandatory or quasi-mandatory assignability
rules, which apply regardless of whether the promisee is a small business, actually
serve the interests of small businesses. Small businesses are often debtors rather than
creditors in contracts for goods and services, and like large businesses, they may have
a host of reasons to restrict the assignment of rights against them.290 Moreover,

285. Beale, Gullifer & Paterson, supra note 53, at 205 (referring to “a concern that [bans
on assignments] at best increase the cost of an essential form of credit and at worst starve
businesses of credit—in particular, smaller businesses which are most dependent on their
receivables to raise financing”).
286. See Akseli, supra note 19, at 651–52.
287. Akseli recognizes this point but suggests that the Convention may aid small
businesses indirectly, by encouraging developing countries to follow its lead in their domestic
laws. Id. at 661.
288. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 144
(2005).
289. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 240 (1995).
290. Calnan, supra note 276, at 137.
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policies that either render nonassignment clauses explicitly ineffective or interpret
them in a manner contrary to their apparent meaning are likely to fall harder on
smaller businesses who do want to restrict assignability. In contrast, large businesses
are more likely to be advised of the law and hence less likely to trade away some
other contractual term in return for an (ineffective) nonassignment clause.
Note that small businesses may also be prejudiced by express clauses that make
rights against them assignable, but there appears to be no clamor to protect them from
such clauses. When one combines these observations with the fact that contract law
rarely declines to enforce terms simply because they are unfavorable to small
businesses,291 it is fair to suspect that the “small business” argument often serves as
a fig leaf for the interests of large, well-organized financial institutions whose
interests as transferees would be served by mandatory and quasi-mandatory
assignability rules.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
If the law is unduly weighted towards transferability, how should the balance be
redressed? It is easier to show that the current regime is unjustified than to figure out
what exactly should replace it. Nevertheless, in Part IV, I examine, in turn, whether
any mandatory assignability rules are justified,292 how courts should interpret clauses
concerning assignment, 293and the default rules courts should apply where the parties
have not provided guidance on the assignability issue. 294 In addition, I suggest that a
closely analogous area of the law, agency law’s doctrine of the undisclosed principal,
is similarly biased towards an impersonal view of contractual rights and is likewise
in need of reform.295
A. Mandatory Assignability Rules
As argued above, the current, wide-ranging mandatory assignability rules
recognized by U.C.C. Article 9 do not appear to be justified either by an externalitiesbased or a paternalism-based rationale.296 It may be possible, however, to justify
more narrowly drawn exceptions to freedom of contract.
The perceived need to ensure that small businesses have access to receivables
financing, for example, might conceivably justify a specific mandatory rule directly
aimed at helping such businesses. If policymakers conclude that large-business
promisors systematically force their small-business promisee-suppliers to accept
nonassignment clauses, legislative action might be justified on paternalism grounds.
Recent experience in England may prove instructive. There, the U.K. government
initially sought to introduce a general mandatory assignability rule for receivables,

291. See Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 297 (2005).
292. Section IV.A.
293. Section IV.B.
294. Section IV.C
295. Section IV.D.
296. See supra Sections III.B–D; see also Ayres, supra note 163, at 2087 (“[P]aternalism
and externalities provide the ur-justifications for both mandatory rules and sticky defaults”).
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justifying the proposed rule with reference to the needs of small businesses. 297 Critics
of the reform noted that the initial proposals restricted contractual freedom whether
the promisee was a large business or a small business. 298 In response to these
criticisms, the government revised the rules so that, as enacted, they exempt contracts
where the promisee is a large enterprise.299
Even when a mandatory assignability rule is limited to circumstances where the
promisee is a small or medium-sized business, the arguments in favor of overriding
freedom of contract must overcome the standard objections to helping “weaker”
parties avoid contract terms that disserve their interests.300 Declining to enforce a
particular term does not change the parties’ bargaining power. If “stronger”
promisors know that they are unable to restrict transferability, they are likely to pass
the cost of this limitation on to the “weaker” promisees, either by lowering the prices
that they pay for the promisee’s goods or services or by insisting on other terms that
are less favorable to the promisee. Moreover, if the U.K. government’s reform were
genuinely motivated by an interest in helping small businesses—rather than by the
financial-institution transferees who would certainly benefit from a mandatory
rule—proponents of such a rule would have to explain why this kind of term has
been singled out for special treatment over other unfavorable terms offered to small
businesses.
Another plausible candidate for a justifiable mandatory rule concerns promisee
bankruptcy. Current bankruptcy law overrides many nonassignment clauses in the
event of a promisee’s bankruptcy and gives the trustee the power to assign many
contractual rights (and duties) that would otherwise be unassignable.301 The rationale
for this interference with freedom of contract is that it facilitates corporate
reorganization, serving the public interest by enabling troubled businesses to recover
or to increase the amount paid to their creditors. From this perspective, allowing
promisors to bargain for a right to veto the sale of the bankrupt entity’s assets could
be considered a significant externality. Moreover, overriding nonassignment clauses
may not entail a major setback to the promisor’s interests. Many such clauses are
inserted to prevent opportunistic transfers by the promisee herself—the bankruptcy
proceeding hands the decision to the bankruptcy trustee, who is also subject to court
supervision. Arguably, however, the law should allow parties who wish for the
nonassignment clause to apply even on bankruptcy to stipulate for that result by
explicit contractual provision, rather than impose the current, fully mandatory rule.302

297. See Calnan, supra note 276.
298. See id.
299. Business Contract Terms (Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2018, SI
2018/1254, art. 3 (Eng. & N. Ir.).
300. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in THE
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS, 19 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
301. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (2012); see Ayotte & Hansmann, supra note 24, at 747–49; see
also Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, A Nexus of Contracts Theory of Legal Entities, 42
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 9–10 (2015).
302. See Ayotte & Hansmann, supra note 24, at 748 n.66 (stating that there are “good
reasons” to make bankruptcy override a default rather than a mandatory rule).
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B. Interpreting Assignability Clauses
In the absence of a reason based on paternalism or externalities, 303 courts should
generally give nonassignment clauses their conventional meaning. Indeed, many
commentators have suggested that the argument for a “plain meaning” interpretation
is even stronger where, as here, third parties have an interest in understanding what
the contract means.304 Hence, the general trend towards strict construction of
nonassignment clauses should be abandoned. Where a contract says that a promisee
“shall not assign” or “may not assign” its rights under the contract, this language
should be construed to deprive the promisee of the power to assign its rights.305 The
word “assignment” should be construed to mean “assignment” (rather than
“delegation”).306 And where a contract purports to bar assignment of rights generally,
the bar on assignment should extend to attempted transfers of rights to sue for breach
of contract and for money earned under the contract.307 While these proposals run
counter to the prevailing wind, they are far from radical: some courts have declined
to adopt the “modern approach” to interpreting nonassignment clauses.308
As in the case of fully mandatory rules, more narrowly drawn interpretive
practices favoring assignability could potentially be justified. One testing ground for
such practices is in litigation over whether blanket nonassignment clauses should be
interpreted to include an implied limitation on the right of the promisor to
unreasonably refuse consent to an assignment. Courts have sometimes reached this
conclusion. In Larese v. Creamland Dairies, Inc., the Tenth Circuit found that a
franchisor could not unreasonably refuse consent to a franchisee’s request to assign
its interest, even though the written contract contained no such restriction.309 The
court recognized that its ruling would have been different had the franchisor insisted
on an explicit contractual provision allowing it to refuse consent unreasonably.310
Franchise contracts are almost always drafted by franchisors; thus, the purpose of
adopting this sticky default, according to the court, was “to insure that the franchisee

303. See Ayres, supra note 163, at 2087 (“[P]aternalism and externalities provide the urjustifications for both mandatory rules and sticky defaults”).
304. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 82, at 870.
305. See supra Section II.C.1.
306. See supra Section II.C.2.
307. See supra Section II.C.3.
308. See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating
that Illinois law does not adopt the “magic words” canon); Travertine Corp. v. LexingtonSilverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Minn. 2004) (Minnesota law does not adopt the “magic
words” canon); Star Windshield Repair, Inc. v. W. Nat. Ins. Co., 744 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 768 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 2009) (finding that general
nonassignment clause prohibited post-loss assignment of insurance claim under Minnesota
law).
309. 767 F.2d 716, 718 (10th Cir. 1985); cf. Taylor Equip., Inc. v John Deere Co., 98 F.3d
1028, 1034 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Larese and holding that a facially unrestricted
nonassignment clause in a franchise contract was not subject to a reasonableness limitation).
310. Larese, 767 F.2d at 718 (“We do not hold that a provision which expressly grants to
the franchisor an absolute right to refuse to consent is unenforceable when such an agreement
was freely negotiated.”).
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is put on notice” of the franchisor’s broad assignment power.311 The court’s decision
was influenced by its characterization of the franchise relationship as nearfiduciary.312 Its departure from a plain-meaning interpretation of the clause was thus
based on a potentially compelling (soft) paternalist rationale rather than on a general
belief in free assignability.
C. The Selection of Defaults
This Article has focused mainly on nonassignment clauses because most
contemporary written contracts do contain clauses concerning assignment. But some
contracts make no such provision, in which case the court will need to fill the gap in
the contract where a promisee purports to assign the right and the promisor objects.
Additionally, other contracts only make partial provision concerning assignability,
in which case a default will again be needed to provide for those cases not covered
by the clause.
As noted above, the current default position is that contractual rights are
assignable, unless the assignment violates public policy or would result in a material
change in the promisor’s duty.313 The current default is heavily weighted towards
transferability, especially because the “material change” exception is so narrow.
Notably, with respect to money claims, a change in the identity of the right holder is
seemingly never regarded as a material change, even though the change, in reality,
may be highly consequential.
The selection of default rules is the subject of an extremely large economic
literature.314 The standard approach is that default rules should save on transaction
costs, either by attempting to mimic what the individual parties would have
contracted for had they reached agreement on the matter (a “tailored default”) or by
estimating what a majority of parties, to contracts in general or to a certain class of
contracts, would have agreed to (an “untailored” majoritarian default).315 The current
assignability rules are not tailored defaults; courts do not seem to make much effort
to figure out what the particular parties to the transaction would have wanted. The
rules do sort cases governed by the general rule, where assignability is considered an
appropriate default, from those governed by the exceptions, for which nonassignability is the default. The virtue of the law’s current default approach is that it
is reasonably predictable to lawyers familiar with the case law, because the
exceptions to the default are so rarely applicable.
It is difficult, however, to argue that the current rules are majoritarian. Would
most parties to most contracts agree to assignability? At best, the current default rules
could be defended as a crude attempt at capturing generic party intent. But in many

311. Id.
312. Id. at 717 (“[W]e find that the franchisor-franchisee relationship is one which requires
the parties to deal with one another in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.”).
313. See supra Section II.A.
314. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91–92 (1989); David Charny,
Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1815 (1991); Scott, supra note 82, at 847.
315. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 314, at 91–92.
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cases, the default rules find transferability where the parties would have agreed to
non-transferability. In particular, the refusal to countenance a bad-faith exception to
the presumption—so, for example, rights can be transferred to the promisor’s
competitor or enemy—is difficult to justify. From the standpoint of a majoritarian
approach to default rules, the case for shifting towards a general starting point of
non-assignability, or for at least increasing the size of the exceptions to the
assignability default, is thus strong.
To be sure, the literature on contract law also recognizes the possibility that nonmajoritarian default rules might be justified in the service of efficiency or fairness.
To the extent that the current assignability default does not reflect what the parties to
a particular contract would have agreed, could it instead be justified as a deliberately
non-majoritarian “penalty default”?316 The purpose of such a default would be to
provide an incentive to the party whose interests are harmed by the default to bargain
around it. One potential function for a penalty default is to force a party or parties to
disclose information to third parties. If a promisor who dislikes the default rule of
assignability successfully negotiates a non-assignability clause, the presence of that
clause will inform third parties of the parties’ agreement, including potential
transferees seeking to discern whether or not the right is transferable, and courts later
charged with resolving a dispute over whether the rights are transferable or not.
Based on the analysis in this Article, however, one might just as easily defend the
opposite position as a penalty default. The law could generally assume that rights are
nonassignable, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. For a large class of cases,
this would be a non-majoritarian default. The promisee who wishes to acquire a
transferable right would then bear the burden of insisting on an assignability clause,
thereby providing information to potential transferees and to courts later charged
with resolving a dispute over the right’s transferability.
The current pro-assignability presumption might alternatively be defended as a
mechanism for forcing promisors to inform promisees of the issue of transferability.
Promisees might not otherwise consider the issue during negotiations. By requiring
promisors who to restrict assignment to the seek to include a nonassignment clause
in the contractual text, the law makes promisors provide notice to promisees, which
might prompt the promisee to reject the clause or to bargain for a clause providing
for transferability. Again, however, the opposite rule might just as well be
appropriate: arguably, promisors who are later surprised by transferability are in
greater need of the benefit of an “information-forcing” default than promisees are.
That was the conclusion of the Tenth Circuit in the Larese case discussed in the
previous section;317 but as that case illustrates, it is difficult to generalize about the
relative knowledge of promisors and promisees.
Admittedly, the treatment of express nonassignment clauses provides a more
pressing case for reform than the general default rule of assignability. What is crucial
is that the parties are generally free to displace the default. Arguably, the most
important consideration in the selection of this particular default is clarity so that the
parties know whether or not they have the power to assign. Moreover, courts should
tread carefully when changing preexisting default rules: however non-majoritarian

316. Id. at 98.
317. See supra Section IV.B.
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the current defaults may be, it is likely that some parties have entered into contracts
with the expectation that they will be applied. But the current extent of the proassignability default nevertheless sits uneasily with contract law’s basic ideas.
D. Agency Law’s Undisclosed Principal Doctrine
The argument of this Article also has implications for agency law’s undisclosed
principal doctrine. T enters into a contract with A believing that A is contracting in
her own right. In fact, A is acting as UP’s agent. Under the undisclosed principal
doctrine, T has entered into a contract with UP even if T knew nothing of UP’s
existence at the time she entered into the contract.318 The portion of the doctrine that
holds T liable to UP is thus similar to an unexpected assignment.
Unlike the law’s transferability bias, the undisclosed principal doctrine has not
escaped scholarly criticism.319 The doctrine has been continually called an
“anomaly”320 that is “inconsistent with the elementary doctrines of the law of
contract.”321 The doctrine does not always apply: as in the case of assignability, some
rights are considered too personal to be held by undisclosed principals, but, as in the
case of assignability, this exception has been construed narrowly.322 Unlike in the
case of assignability, there do not seem to be any mandatory rules preventing the
parties’ ability to exclude it,323 but, as in the case of assignability, the courts seem to
place a narrow construction on attempts to limit its operation by agreement. For
example, the Restatement (Third) of Agency states that a nonassignment clause does
not exclude the undisclosed principal doctrine324—even though the effect of the
undisclosed principal doctrine is almost precisely the effect that a nonassignment
clause is aimed at avoiding. The effect of these rules is often to bring parties into
contractual relationships that can hardly be called consensual.
The undisclosed principal doctrine, to the extent that it confers rights to sue T on
UP,325 has a fundamentally similar effect to the assignability rules considered by this

318. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“When an agent
acting with actual authority makes a contract on behalf of an undisclosed principal, (1) unless
excluded by the contract, the principal is a party to the contract . . . and (3) the principal, if a
party to the contract, and the third party have the same rights, liabilities, and defenses against
each other as if the principal made the contract personally.”).
319. For an economic defence of the doctrine, see Eric Rasmusen, Agency Law and
Contract Formation, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 369 (2004) (defending a default rule of liability
to the undisclosed principal).
320. See, e.g., James Barr Ames, Undisclosed Principal—His Rights and Liabilities, 18
YALE L.J. 443, 443 (1909) (maintaining that the doctrine of the undisclosed principal “ignores
. . . fundamental legal principles . . . [and] should be recognized as an anomaly”).
321. Frederick Pollock, Note, 3 L.Q. REV. 358, 359 (1887).
322. See Sig M. Glukstad, Inc. v. Lineas Aereas Paraguayas, 619 F.2d 457, 458 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that a freight forwarder, acting as an agent for undisclosed principal, could
obtain insurance in its own name on behalf of undisclosed principal).
323. The Restatement recognizes T’s ability to protect herself from the doctrine by
including an express contractual provision. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.03(1).
324. Id. § 6.03 cmt. d.
325. The undisclosed principal doctrine also allows T to sue UP once T learns of UP’s
existence, a rule that is readily defensible if UP can sue T. See id. § 6.03(3).
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Article. One commentator defending the undisclosed principal doctrine has said that
it is “no more inconsistent or anomalous than the rule allowing assignees to bring an
action in contract.”326 Indeed, the most common way to defend the undisclosed
principal doctrine is by analogy to the law of assignment.327 According to Randy
Barnett, “[t]he close theoretical relationship between undisclosed agency doctrine
and the law of assignment also helps explain why and when persons may be ‘forced’
to deal with parties to whom they might object.”328 To the extent this argument has
successfully undercut the argument for the law’s pro-transferability bias, then, it also
provides new reasons to question the breadth of the undisclosed principal doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to identify and undermine contract law’s bias in favor of
transferability. If nothing else, it has sought to shine a critical light on a crucial aspect
of contract law that has long been taken for granted. The Article can be considered a
success if it provokes someone else to develop a more convincing rationale for law’s
refusal to respect freedom of contract on the issue of transferability. Unless such a
rationale is forthcoming, courts and legislatures should work to bring the law of
assignability into line with the purposes for which parties enter into contracts.

326. Tan Cheng-Han, Undisclosed Principals and Contract, 120 L.Q. REV. 480, 481
(2004).
327. In addition to those quoted in the text, see Warren A. Seavey, The Rationale of
Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 879 (1920) (“[B]efore the modern doctrine of the undisclosed
principal arose, [the] conception of a personal relationship in contracting parties had been
destroyed by allowing contracts to be assigned.”); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Undisclosed
Principle of Undisclosed Principals, 21 MCGILL L.J. 298, 299 (1975) (“[W]e are dealing with
an autonomous doctrine in the law of agency, historically derivable from assumpsit, which is
similar to, but not identical with, the devices of assignment and trust . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
328. Barnett, supra note 24, at 1989.

